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ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY VERSUS PUBLIC
CHOICE: THE CASE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN ROAD TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
JONATHAN REMY NASH *
Abstract: This Article argues, using the case of responses to traffic con-
gestion, that public choice theory provides a greater explanation for the
emergence of property rights than does economic efficiency. The tradi-
tional solution to traffic congestion is to provide new roadway capacity,
but that is not an efficient response in that it does not lead to internaliza-
tion of costs and may actually exacerbate congestion problems by induc-
ing traVel that would not have taken place but for the new construction.
By contrast, congestion charges, which impose tolls designed to internal-
ize the costs of driving, offer an efficient way to address the problem of
congestion. Nonetheless, the continued popularity of providing new
roadway capacity turns upon public choice theory. New roadway con-
struction is attractive for politicians as a way to satisfy both constituents
generally, and well-organized and powerful interest groups in particular.
Although congestion charging regimes tend to be less popular across the
board politically, there appears currently to be a shift in position. This Ar-
ticle argues that it is possible for concerns of efficiency to override (or at
least to curtail) politics when the inefficiencies of a response grounded in
political economy become too large. But at the same time, public choice
theory continues to hold considerable sway—the shift toward congestion
pricing may require not only pressing efficiency concerns, but also a shift
in the political climate.
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INTRODUCTION
Two theories on the emergence and development of property
rights regimes dominate the current law and economics literature.'
One is the optimistic idea that economic efficiency drives the definition
and resolution of property rights. 2 The second theory is grounded in
public choice and is far more pessimistic. 8 On this account, property
rights come about when those with the most power in fact want them to
come about.4 Commentators debate which of these theories, or per-
haps more accurately what combination of them, best explains the de-
velopment of property rights regimes in particular settings. 5
This Article addresses these questions in the specific setting of the
societal response to a growing problem on the nation's roads: traffic
congestion.8 As land development continues to consume previously
unoccupied land, more people drive more vehicles greater distances.?
The result is traffic—lots of it. 8 And lots of traffic has many deleterious
effects for society; including time delays, for both people and freight;
the magnification of the environmental impact of driving; and, of late,
"road rage. "s
Sec Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 311 LEGAL STUD.
3421, S423-33 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. hr.. L.
REV. 275, 278-81 (describing competing theories for the development of market-based
mechanisms to govern environmental resource management: wealth-maximization theory,
based on maximizing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and distribution theory, based upon interest
groups and politics); see also Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evo-
lution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv, 117, 119-24 (2005) (contrasting the Demsetzian
approach with an approach that takes account of the role of political institutions in the
development of property rights).
2 See Levmore, supra note 1, at S423-25; Merrill, supra note 1, at 278-80.
3 See Levmore, supra note 1, at S425-33; Merrill, supra note 1, at 280-81.
See Levmore, supra note 1, at S425-33; Merrill, supra note 1, at 280-81.
5 See Levmore, supra note 1, at 3433-50; Merrill, supra note 1, at 286-89.
6 See infra notes 53-433 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional
Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. lbw. 57, 71-74 (1999) (discussing the traffic implications of
urban sprawl).
See, e.g., Tirza S. Waterman, Breaking the Logjam: The Peak Pricing of Congested Urban
Roadways Under the Clean Air Act to Improve Air Quality and Reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled, DUKE
ENV IT. L. & PoCv F. 181, 181-82 (1998) ("As a nation, we are increasingly stuck in traf-
fic.... Traffic congestion has increased rapidly in urban areas where growth in volume of
motorists has risen faster than the growth in roadway capacity.").
9 See R.H.M. EMMERINK, INFORMATION AND PRICING IN ROAD TRANSPORTATION 3-4
(1998); ROBERT G. MCGILLIVRAY, ON ROAD CotgoEsTioN THEORY 2 (1974); Robert F.
Biel mg u ist, American "Road Rage": A Scary and Tangled Cultural-Legal Pastiche, 80 NEB. L. REV.
17, 36-37 (2001); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social
Norms: Commodibing California's Carpool Lanes, 75 INn. L.J. 1231, 1237 (2000); Wahrman,
supra note 8, at 182.
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Traffic congestion presents an excellent setting in which to gauge
the effectiveness of the competing explanations for the development of
property and governance regimes because the two outcomes toward
which each alternative moves differ so clearly." The public choice ex-
planation leads to the "solution" of expanding roadway capacity,
whereas economic efficiency argues in favor of more market-based
regulatory regimes governing roadway access and usage." In other
words, efficiency argues in favor of greater property rights, while public
choice instead advocates for reducing scarcity and thus reducing the
demand for property rights. 12
Because roads are largely supplied to the public at large by the
government, congestion tends to be a problem that concerns politi-
cians." The traditional solution to a congestion problem is simple:
build more roads." This can mean the addition of new lanes to existing
roadways, or it can mean the construction of entirely new thorough-
fares, expressways, and freeways." A more general formulation of this
approach is the provision of new roadway capacity. 16
New roadway capacity, however, is not an efficient way to address
traffic congestion. 17 Even if congestion is abated, the fact remains that
providing roadway capacity fails to address the fundamental underlying
economic problem—the ability of roadway users to externalize costs on
other roadway users and on society at large." The provision of new
roadway capacity does not require or lead to the internalization of
10 See infra notes 148-199 (explaining the application of the public choice theory to
traffic), 200-394 (explaining the efficiency of congestion pricing).
11 See infra notes 148-394.
52 See infra notes 148-394.
18 See LEE MERTZ, U.S. DEPT OF TRANSP„ ORIGINS OF IIIE INTERSTATE, http://www.
fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/origin.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2008) (detailing the history of
the federal involvement with the Interstate Highway system); see also Robert Jay Dilger,
TEA-21: Transportation Policy, Pork Barrel Polities, and American Federalism, 28 l'ustrus 49,50
(1998) (describing the relative attractiveness of road projects to politicians, and the size
and import of congressional transportation committees).
14 See EMMERINK, supra, note 9, at 4.
13 See infra notes 148-199 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 148-199 and accompanying text.
17 See Lewis M. Fulton, Robert B. Noland, Daniell Meszler & John V. Thomas, A Statis-
tical Analysis of Induced Travel Effects in the U.S. Mid-Atlantic Region, 31 TRANSP. & STAT. 1,13
(2000) [hereinafter Fulton et all; Robert B. Noland & William A. Cowart, Analysis of Met.
ropolitan Highway Capacity and the Growth in Vehicle Miles of Travel, 27 TRANSPORTATION 363,
387-88 (2000), available at http://www.cts.cvic.ac.uk/documents/publications/iccts00028 .
pdf; Robert B. Noland, Relationship Between Highway Capacity and Induced Vehicle Travel, 35
TRANSP. RES. PART A 47,70 (2001).
18 See Wahrman, supra note 8, at 196.
676	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:673
costs. 19 As such, it encourages an inefficiently high level of use of the
resource. 2° Neither does new capacity allocate roadway capacity effi-
ciently to those who value it most. 21
Moreover, not only is the generation of new roadway capacity not
an efficient way to address congestion, over time new capacity may
serve to exacerbate congestion problems, 22 This is because of the phe-
nomenon of "induced travel."23 Essentially, new roadway capacity may
induce additional travel that would not have taken place but for the
new construction ,24
By contrast, congestion charges offer an efficient way to address
the problem of congestion. 25 As opposed to simple tolls (which tend to
be uniformly priced and are intended simply to finance the mainte-
nance of the roadway or to augment government coffers), congestion
charges are, simply put, tolls that are designed to force drivers to inter-
nalize the congestion costs that their driving imposes on other drivers. 26
By forcing drivers to internalize.at least some of the negative externality
that they impose by using roadways, a system of congestion charges is
likely to reduce roadway usage closer to an efficient level.27 Also, the
use of charges is more likely to result in the allocation of the resource
of roadway usage to those who value it most. 28
Despite its inferiority in terms of efficiency, the provision of new
roadway capacity remains by far the more popular option. 29 The reason
for this can be found by looking to public choice theory. 3° On the one
19 See infra notes 148-199 and accompanying text.
2° See infra notes 118-199 and accompanying text.
21 Sec infra notes 148-199 and accompanying text. It is possible that positive network
externalities may outweigh the inefficiencies I identify in the text. As I discuss below, how-
ever, relying on these positive externalities to justify new roadway construction as a re-
sponse to traffic congestion is, at best, dubious. See infra notes 111-156 and accompanying
text.
See Fulton et al., supra note 17, at 2.
23 Sec id. at 2-3.
24 See id.
23 Sec BOrje johatisson & Lars•Oran Mattsson, Principles of Road Pricing, in ROAD PRIC-
ING: THEORY, EMPTRIGAL ASSESSMENT AND POLICY 7, 7-8 (BOrje Johansson & Lars-GOran




29' See EMMERINK, Slip112 note 9, at 4. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RE-
PoRT 'ro Tim COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, U.S. SENATE, DEVELOP-
ING STRATEGIES FOR ENHANCING MOBILITY: A NATIONAL. CHALLENGE (2002) [hereinafter
GAO, DEVELOPING STRATEGIES], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02775.pdf.
See lituzbee, supra note 7, at 80; see also Peter T. Kilborn, In Rural Areas, Interstates
Build Their Own Economy, N.Y. Timm, July 14, 2001, at Al.
2008]	 Economic Efficiency, Public Choice & Road Traffic Management 	 677
hand, new roadway construction tends to be very attractive for politi-
cians as a way to satisfy both constituents generally and interest groups
that tend to be well-organized and powerful. 31 On the other hand, con-
gestion charging regimes—depending upon the setting in which they
are introduced—tend to be less popular across the board politically. 32
A study of the evolution of government responses to traffic conges-
tion provides insight into which theory of the development of property
rights regimes—efficiency or public choice—holds sway under particu-
lar circumstances. 33 The fact that providing new roadway capacity re-
mains more popular suggests the dominance of the public choice ex-
planation for the development of property rights over the theory
grounded in efficiency."
At the same time, there appears currently to be something of a
shift in position. 35 In recent years, Congress has authorized pilot con-
gestion charging regimes. 36 Moreover, experimentation with conges-
tion pricing programs is growing oversea s—including a notable pro-
gram in London—and a serious proposal for congestion pricing
recently emerged to govern and reduce traffic in New York City's cen-
tral business district. 37 Further, President Bush's Secretary of Transpor-
tation, Mary Peters, is a strong advocate of congestion pricing. 38 This
suggests that, though political economy tends to be a powerful force, it
is possible for concerns of efficiency to override (or at least to curtail)
that force when the inefficiencies of a response grounded in political
economy become too large. 39
Yet, even in the face of weighty efficiency arguments in favor of
congestion pricing, political opposition to such programs remains vital
31 See Buzbee, supra note 7, at 80 ("Real estate and transportation construction inter-
ests have substantial monetary incentives to favor continued government expenditures on
the highways .. • that are essential to urban sprawl.").
32 See, e.g., Strahilevtiz, supra note 9, at 1245-49 (describing objections to congestion
pricing); Wahrman, supra note 8, at 204 ("Public resistance to congestion pricing is under-
standable ....").
33 See infra notes 148-199 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 179-199 and accompanying text.
35 See, e.g., Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy
for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 1604,119 Stat. 1144,1249-50 (2005) (codified as amended
at 23 U.S.C. § 149 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)) (continuing federal involvement in congestion
pricing projects begun in 1991).
35 See id.
37 See infra notes 251-257,413-421 and accompanying text.
35 See Matthew L. Wald, Bush Chooses Transportation Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,2006,
at A15.
35 See id.
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and often successful. 4° First, although it was not enacted in that form,
the Senate considered a bill that would have curtailed the pilot pro-
grams, thus showing the continued strength of political opposition to
congestion pricing. 41 Second, consider that even in New York City—a
relatively politically homogeneous municipality in which reliance upon
public transit is already well-established and far exceeds the national
norm—opposition to congestion pricing proved strong enough to keep
congestion pricing proposals from moving beyond the proposal stage.42
Moreover, political economy also offers an explanation for the
present shift toward greater embrace of congestion pricing.° The fron-
tiers of congestion pricing—that is, those settings where congestion
pricing seems to be growing fastest—are, other than heavily urbanized
areas where the addition of new roadways is essentially not an option,
settings in which new roadway construction will be subject to conges-
tion pricing." Such an approach blunts political opposition to conges-
tion pricing on the ground that it imposes new fees because existing
roadways remain accessible at no charge. 45 It also draws support from
the powerful construction and real estate industries as well as organ-
ized labor—all of which tend to benefit from new road construction.°
Finally, the introduction of congestion pricing offers a benefit to a
small but growing constituency: industries that research and manufac-
ture the technologies used to implement congestion pricing regimes.
Part I of this Article examines the two competing economic expla-
nations for the development of property rights. 47 Part II presents an
4° See, e.g., Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2004,
S. 1072, 108th Cong. § 1609(c)(1) (2004) (seeking to repeal the authorization of future
value-pricing programs).
41 See id. The same proposal, however, would have allowed the continuation of those
programs already in place. See id. § 1609(c) (2).
42 See, e.g., Andy Newman, Outside Manhattan, Many Oppose Bloonthetg's Traffic Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2007, at B1 (detailing the opposition to a proposal to charge drivers eight
dollars to drive in the most congested parts of Manhattan).
43 See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1247 (noting that users see themselves as entitled to
use freely existing roadways but that congestion pricing receives greater support for newly
constructed toll roads).
44 See U.S. Dep't of Transp., List of Projects by Type, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/
otps/projectlist.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008) [hereinafter List of Projects by Type] (list-
ing areas where congestion pricing is under study for new roadway construction).
4° See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1247.
4° See Buzbee, supra note 7, at 80 ("Real estate and transportation construction inter-
ests have substantial monetary incentives to favor continued government expenditures on
the highways ....").
47 See infra notes 53-83 and accompanying text.
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overview of the economics of roadway usage. 48 Parts III and IV evaluate
the provision of new roadway capacity and congestion charging from
the perspectives of efficiency and political economy. 49 These Parts ar-
gue that congestion charges are preferable from an efficiency stand-
point but that the provision of new roadway capacity is today much
more likely to be the political system's response to congestion prob-
lems." Part V considers whether a recent movement toward greater
acceptance of congestion pricing may reflect the ascension of the effi-
ciency theory; it uses New York City's recent flirtation with congestion
pricing as a case study. 51 This Article concludes, however, that the pub-
lic choice account continues to have greater explanatory power. 52
I. COMPETING ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EVOLUTION OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Commentators have identified two primary reasons for the devel-
opment of property rights.53 One theory is based upon notions of eco-
nomic efficiency. 54 The other is based upon support for property rights
development on the part of powerful interest groups."
First, building upon the work of Harold Demsetz, 56 commentators
have argued that economic efficiency drives the development and evo-
48 See infra notes 84-147 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 148-394 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 148-394 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 395-433 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 423-433 and accompanying text.
55 See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 1, at 5423-33; Merrill, supra note 1, at 278-81.
54 See Levmore, supra note 1, at S423-25; Merrill, supra note 1, at 278-80.
55 See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 1, at 5423-33; Merrill, supra note 1, at 278-81; see also
Wyman, supra note 1, at 119-24. Saul Levmore characterizes the efficiency theory, which
he refers to as the "transaction-cost" story, as more optimistic than the more pessimistic
public choice theory, which he refers to as the "interest-group" story. See Levmore, supra
note 1, at 5432. Thomas Merrill does not seem to afford any greater moral approval to the
public choice theory by his use of the monicker "distributional theory." See Merrill, supra
note 1, at 280-81. Merrill explains that, because the efficiency theory, which he refers to as
the "wealth maximization theory," looks only to overall societal balance between benefits
and costs, it cares only that a surplus of benefits over costs exists, not how that surplus is
distributed among societal actors. See id. at 278-79. Conversely, the public choice theory
takes into account the distribution of assets—indeed, it may generate property rights re-
gimes that "fail to maximize societal wealth." Id. at 280. The distribution that emerges,
however, will not be based (at least not reliably) upon equitable considerations, but rather
upon the political power of various interest groups. See id. ("[Society) will adopt those re-
gimes whose distributional features are most favorable to the groups that can organize
most effectively to influence the political process."). .
66 See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. EcoN. REV.
347 (1967).
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lution of property rights.57 Economic efficiency is measured by total
wealth maximization, using a Kaldor-Hicks measure of efficiency.° The
notion here is that property rights will be introduced to the extent that,
and in a way such that, the benefits derived from delineating and en-
forcing property rights exceed the attendant costs. 59 The absence of a
property regime (or the absence of a sufficiently mature property re-
gime) may mean that, where a resource is scarce, societal actors engage
in "rent dissipation" —wasteful activity to try to capture the economic
rents associated with the scarce resource—and that users of the re-
source are able to externalize costs on others and thus artificially keep
their own costs down.° Thus, the introduction of a property regime (or,
as appropriate, the introduction of a more mature property regime)
offers the benefit of reducing these problems. 61 But the implementation
(or upgrade) of a property rights regimes has costs as well, including
"the costs of defining property rights, identifying the owners of such
rights, and protecting the rights against interference by others."62
The efficiency hypothesis claims that a new property regime will be
implemented when the benefits of the new regime outweigh its costs.°
It also claims that an existing property rights regime will be dismantled
(and perhaps a less mature regime introduced) when the costs of the
regime exceed its benefits." These claims make it possible to identify
several conditions that will determine whether, and when, regimes will
be created or dismantled: resource scarcity, externality size, and admini-
stration costs.65 First, as a resource grows scarcer, it is more likely that a
property regime governing the resource will be introduced; conversely,
if the resource becomes more readily available, a property regime be-
comes less necessary.° Second, as the externalities associated with re-
57 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 1, at 278-79; Wyman, supra note 1, at 117-24.
58 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 88-103 (1981) (explaining the
wealth-maximization principle of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency; and differentiating the same
from Pareto efficiency).
59 See Levmore, supra note 1, at S923-25; Merrill, supra note 1, at 278-80.
60 Merrill, supra note 1, at 278.
61 Id.
62 Id.
55 See Levmore, supra note 1, at S424-25.
64 See id. (noting that the evolution of property rights is not a one-way street and dis-
cussing the possibility of property rights regimes devolving).
66 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 56, at 350; Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Con-
trols.- Management Strategies for Common Resource, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 5-8; Henry E. Smith,
Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S453, S462-63 (2002).
" See, e.g., Rose, supra note 65, at 5-8 (describing how greater scarcity of a resource
may prompt environmental regulation).
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source use become larger, it becomes more cost-effective to have a
property regime, with a property regime becoming less cost-effective as
externalities shrink. 67 Third, a reduction in administrative costs makes a
property rights regime more likely; an increase makes one less likely. 66
A second explanation that commentators offer to explain the de-
velopment of property rights is grounded upon the theory of public
choice.69 In general, public choice theory looks at government action
as the result of a "market for government action." 70 Under this model,
government actors take steps that are designed to maximize their
chances of remaining in power; for legislators, this means taking ac-
tions that maximize their reelection chances."
The public choice model predicts that government actors will act
in response to pressure brought by interest groups. 72 Interest groups
give rise to demand for certain government actions, and government
actors offer supply in the form of support for different government
actions." Thus, an action is more likely to be taken when it is (i) de-
nianded by more, and more powerful, interest groups, and (ii) sup-
ported by more, and more powerful, government actors. In the envi-
ronmental arena, relevant interest groups are likely to be industry
actors or groups and environmental interest organizations. 74
67 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 56, at 350; Smith, supra note 65, at S462-63.
66 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 65, at 5464 (noting that "with the invention of barbed
wire, [the marginal cost of delineating property rights] shifts down, and we get more activ-
ity in delineating and enforcing rights to grazing areas").
69 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
70 See id.
71 See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (2d ed.
1974).
72 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 69, at 12-37 (describing the role of interest
groups in the political process).
73 See Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental
Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 325-46 (1998) (describing such a marketplace for
environmental regulation).
74 Bruce Yandle makes the quintessential argument that environmental regulation is
the result of a perhaps surprising alliance between environmental "public interest" organi-
zations and industry, or firms within an industry. See BRUCE VANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND
COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 68-82 (1997) (drawing the parallel between the
alliance between Baptists and Bootleggers to produce "Sunday Blue Laws" and contrasting
the "Baptist and Bootlegger" model with other models of regulation). For an argument
that environmental interest organizations act in their own political and economic self-
interests, see Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: . The Politi-
cal Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 Tim. L. REV. 845, 874-88 (1999). For
deeper study of environmental organizations from the perspective of political economy,
see generally Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists? The Political Economy of Environmental Interest Groups,
53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315 (2002).
682	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 49:673
Although it retains a focus on the actions and demands of interest
groups, public choice theory does not suggest that government actors
will be oblivious to, or act blithely contrary to, the broadly held wishes
of their constituents. 75 Ultimately, for legislators and executives, it is the
electorate who decides whether they will remain in power. The ques-
tion remains how public opinion may reach and influence politicians.
First, it is conceivable that "voters sometimes exercise influence in ways
that bypass interest groups."76 Second, public choice theory recognizes
the possibility that public opinion on an issue will be enlisted by "politi-
cal entrepreneurs."77 Political entrepreneurs harness latent public sen-
timent to achieve particular goals—usually the advancement of the po-
litical entrepreneur's career, though perhaps also furthering the public
interest. 78 Note that representatives of special interest organizations-
75 See, e.g., FARBER & FRICREY, supra note 69, at 21. After analyzing possible motives for
the behavior of legislators, Farber and Frickey conclude that
contemporary political science research concerning interest groups and legis-
lator behavior suggest a complex political world ill fitting any simple formula.
To be sure, the national political process appears vulnerable on a variety of
fronts, including domination largely by narrow economic interests and re-
election posturing by representatives. These concerns are reinforced by [the
economic theory of legislation].
Id.
76 David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397,
436 (2002). Spence elucidates:
[P]oliticians can help broader, less wealthy, mass interest groups to overcome
[collective action) disadvantages, particularly in higher-salience policy de-
bates. hi debates over the kind of high-salience issues that produce major
regulatory legislation (the kind that establish an agency's general mission),
politicians act as political entrepreneurs, recognizing the political benefits of
rallying the unorganized supporters of public interest policy goals. This is the
so-called "republican moment" explanation for major regulatory legislation
Id. (citation omitted). Note that Spence's explanation of the phenomenon itself credits
politicians as "political entrepreneurs." Id.; see also infra note 77.
77 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. I, 54 (2003) (noting that political entrepreneurs "emerge when they
can advance politically by offering constituents a collective benefit, even where constitu-
ents lack sufficient interest to engage in concerted political action"); Clayton P. Gillette.
Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 Mien. L. REV. 930,
976 (1988) (referring to a "political entrepreneur" as one "who hopes to enhance his own
career through the success of an organization with which he is associated, or by serving as
a symbol around which diffuse, nonorganized individuals can coalesce" (citation omit-
ted)); cf. William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
F. 247, 271 (2001) (describing political entrepreneurs as "[c]ublic-spirited or perhaps
opportunistic").
78 See Gillette, SUP112 note 77, at 976.
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in furtherance of the purported public interest or otherwise—may act
as political entrepreneurs in order to use public opinion to further the
agenda of the relevant interest groups."
The question remains open as to which of these theories, or what
combination of them, most accurately describes the evolution—or devo-
lution, or lack of evolution—of property rights under which circum-
stances. 80 The succeeding Parts analyze this question in the context of
property rights in roadway access. 81 These Parts demonstrate that one
response to traffic congestion—congestion pricing—is favored under
the efficiency theory, whereas another response—the provision of new
roadway capacity—is favored under the public choice theory. 82 Because
the congestion pricing solution is a property-based solution whereas
new roadway capacity purports to solve the problem by providing more
of the resource, thus reducing scarcity, the setting of roadway access is
an apt one in which to measure the accuracy of the competing theories.
at predicting the evolution of property rights. 83
H. OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF ROADWAY USAGE
A. Roads as an Open-Access Resource
Roads tend to be provided by the government. 84 The use of most
roads, moreover, is provided at no charge to individual users; the roads
are funded at taxpayer expense. 85 Access to most roads is unrestricted. 86
79 See, e.g., Hale E. Sheppard, The NAFTA Trucking Dispute: Pretexts for Noncompliance and
Policy Justifications for U.S. Facilitation of Cross-Border Services, 11 MINN. J. Gtotint, TRADE 235,
254-56 (2002) (noting ulterior motives of unions—domestic job protection—in opposing
opening the United States to trucks from Mexico under the North American Free Trade
Agreement by harnessing public opinion against the idea on the ground that the agree-
ment would compromise public safety); id. at 256 (noting possible ulterior motive of pub-
lic interest organization—favoring rails over roads for cargo transportation—for opposing
opening the United States to trucks from Mexico); Dale B. Thompson, Political Obstacles to
the Implementation of Emissions Markets: Lessons from RECL4ThL 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645,
664-66 (2000) (discussing the possible role of industry representatives as political entre-
preneurs to harness public opinion against application to individuals of a Los Angeles
metropolitan area trading scheme designed to control nitrogen and sulfur dioxide emis-
sions)
14° See infra notes 84-433 and accompanying text (discussing this question as it relates
to roadway access).
81 See infra notes 84-433 and accompanying text.
82 See infra notes 84-433 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 84-433 and accompanying text.
a' This was not always the case. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J.
1315,1383 (1993) ("Private toll roads were in fact familiar features of the early Nineteenth
Century American landscape."). See generally U.S. DEPT OF TRANSP., TOLL. FACILITIES IN
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At low levels of usage, free roads provided by the government fall
within the ambit of "public goods." 87
 The classic definition describes
THE UNITED STATES: BRIDGES-ROADS-TUNNELS-FERRIES (2007) [hereinafter Tom. FACILI-
TIES IN THE U.S.], available at http://www.Ihwa.dot.gov/ohim/tollpage/to112007.pdf
 (pre-
senting a history of toll roads in the United States). Richard Epstein has discussed the
reasons for the shift away from privately owned toll roads. See Richard A. Epstein, The Allo-
cation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 5515, 5522 (2002) ("The
state monopoly [over highways] is intended to counteract the Balkanization of transporta-
tion services that would necessarily arise if ownership of the highway system were distrib-
uted among several private parties, each with the absolute right to exclude others."); see
also Ellickson, supra, at 1381-85 (describing, in economic terms, the natural evolution of
government provision of roads); Levmore, supra note 1, at 5439-35 (same). But el
Levmore, supra note I, at S435-36 (providing an alternative, interest-group explanation
for the provision and ownership of roads). Although roads provide a benefit for local us-
ers, the fact that they also serve a broader societal need suggests that they should be pro-
vided by governments at higher levels than local governments. See Roger Nober, Note,
Federal Highways and Environmental Litigation: Toward a Theory of Public Choke and Administra-
tive Reaction, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 229, 237 (1990).
Despite the history of movement away from privately owned roads and the traditional
justifications for public ownership of highways, there are some signs of a resurgence in
privately owned highways, at least in some areas of the country. See, e.g., Steven Ginsberg, A
Future Free from Gridlock, for a Price: Toll Lane Network Swiftly Taking Form, WAsn. Pos . '', Dec.
12, 2005, at Al (describing likely construction of network of express lanes in the metro-
politan Washington area, "many of which will be built and operated by private firms");
Steven Ginsberg, Australian Firm Buys Greenway: Company Is Latest to Enter D.C. Market as
Privatization Spreads, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2005, at B3 (noting the purchase of a private
road in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area by "a major player ... at a time when
officials are considering privatizing many of the region's roads"); Patrick Jackson & J.L.
Miller, Privatizing Highways: Solution or Setback? Nationwide, Roads Being Leased with Mixed
Results, WILMINGTON NEWS1 (Del.), Nov. 27, 2005, at Al.
' 66
 See Ellickson, supra note 84, at 1389; Levmore, supra note 1, at S434-35 (offering an
explanation for government provision of road access at no charge based upon the "ex-
penses associated with toll collection"). Robert C. Ellickson argues:
Public-finance theorists argue that, once a right-of-way has been provided, the
marginal costs of accommodating an additional traveler on it are close to zero
(at least until the road becomes congested). When this is so, it is socially op-
timal not to levy tolls. In addition, especially on little traveled ways, the ad-
ministrative costs of collecting tolls from trip-takers are usually prohibitive.
Ellickson, supra note 84, at 1384. Ellickson anticipated that technological development
might facilitate toll collection—and even the use of discriminatory pricing. See id. at 1389
n.353. Indeed, such technological evolution has come to pass. See Wahrman, supra note 8,
at 196 ("It is only recently that the concept [of congestion pricing] became administra-
tively feasible with the introduction of electronic tolls and computerized toll cards.").
86 See, e.g., 39A C.J.S. Highways § 1 (2003) ("The terns 'highway' means a way open to
all the people without distinction for passage and repassage at their pleasure ... .").
n Cf. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision
of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 377 (1998) (identifying roads as an example of a public
good); Emily Sherwin, Epstein's Property, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. Ray. 697, 701 (2000) (same). See
generally Bruce L. Benson, Are Roads Public Goods, Club Goods, Private Goods, or Com-
mon Pools? (unpublished manuscript on file with author), available at http://garnet.acns
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public goods as fulfilling two criteria: (1) jointness in supply (or nonrival
consumption), meaning that the consumption of the good by. one per-
son does not diminish or otherwise interfere with others' consumption
of the good; and (2) imposSibility of exclusion, meaning that, once the
good is in supply, no one can be prevented from consuming the good. 88
Public roads certainly meet the latter criterion: Once a public road is
opened, all members of the public are free to use the road; 89 they are an
open-access resource." Additionally, the use of the road by relatively few
does not diminish or interfere with others' use of the road. 91
This join mess in supply, however, is diminished by higher levels of
usage:92 the use of the road by large numbers of people may lead to con-
gestion, which will interfere with people's consumption of the good.93
Tirza Wahrman explains:
.fsu.edu/-bbenson/hywys.doc (last visited Apr. 9, 2008) (describing possible economic
categorizations of roads).
88 E.g., Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV. 795, 801-02 (1987).
88 See Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Frameworii for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36
U.C. DAyis L. Ray. 813, 838 (2003) ("Roads are an imperfect example of [jjoint [else
because obeying traffic laws is a condition to their use. But for the most part, we have de-
cided that transportation is important enough that there should be no exclusions, which
would not be the case if; for example, tolls were imposed to alleviate congestion."); Mark
A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 534 (2003) ("Roads . • have some of
the characteristics of a public good: it is difficult to exclude nonpaying users.").
90 See Ellickson, supra note 84, at 1381 (noting the important distinction, ignored by
Garrett Hardin, between open-access property, which anyone can enter, and limited-access
property, which is open only to a limited portion of the populace); Thomas W. Merrill,
Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 311 LEGAL STUII). 5331,
S335 (2002) (noting the same distinction and observing that it was ignored by Harold
Demsetz).
Dl See Wahrman, supra note 8, at 196.
92 See infra Figure 1 (depicting the private costs and social costs curve as collinear until
a particular threshold level of trips per hour is reached, indicating that negative external-
ities do not arise until the threshold level is reached). Mark Hall and John Colombo ex-
plain:
Many services that are said to be public goods do not actually face an absolute
indivisibility problem. Instead, it is merely difficult or uneconomical to assess
each consumer's benefit and, therefore, charge him or her appropriately. For
instance, when the government builds a road, it sometimes erects a toll booth
to charge the particular drivers who use the road, suggesting that a private
good is involved. It is not impossible to do this for every road, but in most cir-
cumstances this form of revenue collection is less efficient than simply taxing
all residents. Thus, some goods become "public" at one price (or level of
production) but not at another.
Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52
Ohm ST. L.J. 1379, 1395 (1991).
" See Wahrman, supra note 8, at 196.
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Congestion is a classic negative externality. As additional road
users occupy the road, the quality of service provided to all us-
ers declines. When drivers use a highway, they do not pay the
costs they are imposing on other drivers by adding to their de-
lay. The only "costs" incurred by the single driver are running
costs and her own time delay. Traffic should flow smoothly at
the speed limit. As traffic increases, however, the eventual ad-
dition of one more vehicle will slow the flow and increase the
travel time of other vehicles. At this point, congestion begins."
Roads thus do not fall within the dentition of a classic public
good." They are, rather, "congestible public goods. "96 At higher levels of
usage, the road is an open-access resource for which use by an individual
generates negative externalities on other users. 97 The externalities arise
because of the differential between the costs that individual users see
94 Id.
BOrje Johansson and Lars-GOran Mattsson explain ways in which roads fall within,
and outside, the definition of a classic public good. See Johansson & Mattsson, supra note
25, at 9-10. They distinguish between actual use of a road as opposed to a road's potential
capacity. See id. at 9. Viewed in terms of its capacity, a road "can be appreciated over time as
a potential capacity, even by those individuals who do not use it regularly." Id.
With respect to use, Johansson and Mattsson explain that "[t] he use of a road is ...
only nonrivalrous within given bounds" (i.e., to the extent that congestion does not de-
velop). Id. at 10. As such, only "within limits" can the normal use of road space ... be
categorised as collective." Id.
In analyzing a road's potential capacity, Johansson and Mattsson analogize to a Fire-
house: just as "[tl he capacity of the fire brigade is kept in readiness," the potential capacity
of a road highlights its "insurance aspect" or "readiness feature." Id. Moreover, this "poten-
tial value" is "not necessarily rivalrous." Id. Thus, "road capacity is ... a public resource
with regard to its insurance properties." Id.
96 E.g., Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 88, at 802 n.23 ("[G]oods may have `public'
characteristics without being 'pure' public goods. For instance, congested public goods,
like highways or national parks, may exist in which use is nonrival up to a point, although
additional users may reduce the enjoyment of other users."); John A. Henning, Jr., Com-
ment, Mitigating Price Effects with a Housing Linkage Fee, 78 CAL. L. Rev. 721, 743 (1990).
97 Even at low levels of roadway usage, driving a vehicle generates pollution that may,
in whole or in part, be an externality. To the extent that is the case, however, the external-
ity is the result of driving, not usage of any particular roadway. Congestion itself, however,
may exacerbate the amount of pollution generated; the marginal additional pollution is an
externality that results from congestion. See infra Figure 1; see also Craig N. Oren, Getting
Commuters Out of Their Cams: 41 1hat Went Wrong?, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 201 (1998) (not-
ing that "traffic congestion and air pollution are not entirely congruous problems, and so
have different solutions" and that "[drip reduction for the sake of congestion relief largely
takes the form of shifting employee trips out of a narrow peak period").
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and the actual total costs.98 As congestion grows, this differential gets
larger, meaning that the congestion externality worsens. 99
B. Roadway Usage and Negative Externalities
The fact that users externalize some of the costs of public roadway
usage gives rise to two problems. 1 °8 First, there will likely be an ineffi-
cient allocation of the roadway resource. 101 The resource will probably
not be allocated to those who value it most. 102 Second, the level of road
usage will not be efficient. 183 Because of the negative externalities, the
roadways will be overused.'"
The first effect of the negative externality on roadway usage is that
the scarce resource of roadway space likely will not be allocated effi-
ciently (i.e., to those who value it most). 108 In the absence of any organ-
ized, top-clown system, roadway space will probably be allocated on the
basis of time and effort, according to a "rule of first capture," 106 Main-
taining an open-access free roadway is tantamount to distributing a
valuable resource with a price cap of zero. When scarce goods are made
available at less than their true cost, a shadow market will develop in
°a See EMMERINK, supra note 9, at 36.
99
 Timothy Hau elucidates:
[[Imagine a motorist entering a road that is initially traffic-free. ... As more
and more vehicles enter the traffic stream, traffic speed slows, and average
travel time increases. However, the cost of an incremental trip to society—the
marginal cost—rises faster than its average (time) cost. If that last trip were to
be averted, travel time savings to other users on the facility would in fact be
reaped ....
Timothy D. Hau, A Conceptual Framework for Pricing Congestion and Road Damage, in ROAD
PRICING, supra note 25, at 57, 58.
too See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
Cul. L. REv. 471, 486 (2003) (distinguishing between technological externalities, which
impose a "real cost on third parties," and pecuniary externalities, which simply "alter[ I
the distribution of wealth," and noting that congestion "could impose either type of exter-
nality, or both types").
101 See Hsu, supra note 89, at 838.
102
 See id.
1°3 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)
(describing the overconsumption of goods that occurs when the costs of increased con-




10° Hsu, supra note 89, at 838 ("[W] hen highways become congested, fsjI oint [u]se fails
in that allocations of use are not necessarily made in an economically efficient manner.").
108 See generally Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
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some other form of effective currency." 7 For example, when a popular
baseball team makes playoff tickets available to the general public,
ticket-purchaser lines often form well in advance of the sale of tickets.
This suggests that demand for the ticket outstrips supply (i.e., the tick-
ets are priced below what the standard market would bear) and that, as
a consequence, people are willing to bid time (in place of money) in an
effort to garner tickets.m Similarly, cities often offer street or municipal
lot parking at rates far below the rates charged by private parking facili-
ties (perhaps even free of charge); 109 as a consequence, drivers expend
considerable time and effort in searching for available metered or free
parking.n° In effect, time and effort become the primary commodities
according to which the resource is allocated." An appropriate adapta-
tion of the "rule of first capture" prevails)"
In the case of roadways, time, presumably, will be the primary fac-
tor in allocating the resource.n 3 People's demand for roadway space
will vary inversely with the time it takes to drive a mile, because "[a] t
some level of congestion, any given driver will choose to avoid dealing
with that congestion, either by choosing an alternative route or mode,
changing the departure time of the trip, selecting a shorter trip to a
similar activity, or avoiding the trip entirely." For any given level of
congestion, then, the drivers who gain access to the resource are those
who are willing to accept the drive with that level of congestion. 115
But the "rule of first capture," based as it is on expenditures of
time and effort, is not likely to achieve an efficient allocation of the re-
107 See generally GARY S. BEUSER, Tilt; ECONoMic APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5-6
(1976).
IN Cf. BECKER, supra note 107, at 6 (describing "office waiting time for physicians" as
"one component of the full price of physician services").
109 Epstein, supra note 84, at 5539. Epstein speculates that distributive justice may ex-
plain this discrepancy. See id. For a discussion of this point in the context of congestion
charging. see infra notes 371-376,393 and accompanying text.
Some municipalities offer street parking to neighborhood residents for a fixed, rela-
tively inexpensive fee. For a description of a proposal to introduce such a program in New
York City, see John Rosenthal, Op-Ed, Give Residents a Place to Park, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,2004,
§ 4. at 7.
110 See Epstein, supra note 84, at S52I-28.
111 See id.
112 See id. at S523-24 (drawing the analogy between the "rule of first capture" in Pierson
v. Past for foxes, and the allocation of parking spaces).
113 See Fulton et al., supra note 17, at 3.
114 Id.
115 See id. Drivers might make these decisions on a daily (e.g., what route to take that
day and what time to travel) or an overall basis (e.g., where to live), but the point remains
the same.
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source.n 6 Economically speaking, each person will decide how much
time to put into searching for an inexpensive parking space based upon
the relative value of the person's time to the expense of a "full-freight"
parking space.n 7 Thus, an individual who values an inexpensive park-
ing space more than a second individual does may nevertheless not
pursue—and, therefore, not obtain—an inexpensive parking space if
the second person values her time so much less than the first person
values his, such that it is economically rational for the second person,
but not the first, to invest considerable time and effort in searching for
an inexpensive parking space. 118
In the case of roadways, persons who would pay considerable
amounts of money to gain access to a relatively uncongested roadway in
the end may not use the roadway because it is not worth the investment
of time that road usage requires. 119 Instead, the resource of roadway
usage may go to people who value the resource less, but who also value
their time less such that it is worth it to them to expend their (relatively
lower valued) time to obtain roadway usage. 120 In the absence of a pri-
vate market, the time-based allocations will prevail. 121 Furthermore,
there is no easy way for a private market in roadway usage to arise. 122
118 See MCGILLIVRAY, supra note 9, at 2-3.
117 See BECKER, supra note 107, at 6.
116 Conceivably, this situation could be ameliorated through Coasean bargaining, see
generally 1Z1-1. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 311— & Ecorr. 1 (1960), if the first person
were able to bargain with the second person and purchase the parking space for cash. The
transaction costs, however, are likely to be prohibitively high in most such circumstances.
Cf. McGILLIvitny, supra note 9, at 2-3 (explaining why time-cost is generally not monetiz-
able).
118 See McGfwv HAv , supra note 9, at 2-3.
in sec id,
121 See id. Time-cost is in general not monetizable:
[I]f the [extent of the congestion] queue can be predicted on a daily, weekly,
seasonal, or some other basis, people will recognize this and include it in
their decision process. For example, if people feel that a given trip will take a
half hour longer than other times of the day, with all the attendant woes of
stop and go travel, they may conclude that it is not worth going. Congestion
in that sense provides its own toll. If everyone knows that the trip will take a
half hour longer, only those will go that value the trip above that. But there is
no option to trade money for that time. It is gone, and that is that.
Id.
122 A private market here is even harder to imagine than in the case of parking spots.
Commuter meeting zones may be one example of an attempt in the context of High Oc-
cupancy Vehicle lanes.
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A second effect of the negative externality on roadway usage is that
the level of usage will be inefficiently high.'" At higher levels of usage
where congestion occurs, a road is an open-access resource for which
use by an individual generates negative externalities on other users. 124
Commentators have identified such a circumstance as potentially sub-
ject to a "tragedy of the commons."125 The ability to externalize costs on
others gives rise to an incentive to overconsume the resource. 126 Al-
though individuals—and society generally—would be better off if eve-
ryone agreed not to overuse the resource, every individual has an eco-
nomic incentive to defect and over-consume the resource. 127 Because
individual users are able to externalize some of the costs of roadway
usage, individuals use the road who would not use the road were they
forced to bear the full, actual costs of their roadway usage.
The critical point is that the costs that an individual roadway user
bears (in the absence of congestion charges or some other method of
cost-internalization) are less than the actual, total societal costs of that
user's usage. 125 Economic analysis suggests that an individual who is con-
sidering using a particular roadway will determine whether to do so
based upon a balancing of the marginal benefit derived from using the
road (as opposed to the other option (s)) against the marginal costs as-
sociated with roadway usage. Prospective users can expect to bear some
costs themselves, including travel time, gasoline, oil, and vehicle wear-
and-tear. 129 To the extent that congestion exists, however, prospectiVe
users can expect to externalize some of their costs on other users. Thus,
we can expect that some users for whom the actual marginal costs of
roadway usage would outweigh the marginal benefits will choose none-
theless to use the road because of the ability to externalize some costs.
This result is depicted in Figure 1. The aggregate demand curve
for roadway usage in the absence of full internalization is represented
by curve D as the demand for travel per time interval as a function of
cost (including time). D's negative slope reflects the fact that, as a gen-
128 See generally Hardin, supra note 103.
124 se., id .
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 The likelihood of the undesirable outcome results from the fact that the tragedy of
the commons puts individuals in a multiple-player prisoner's dilemma-style game. On the
prisoner's dilenuna game generally, and on the relation of the prisoner's dilemma to the
tragedy of the conunons, see Doum..As G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME TIIEORV AND THE LAW 33-
34 (1994).
128
	 infra note 223 and accompanying text.
129 Wahrman, supra note 8, at 197.
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eral matter, the more costly it is to drive a given distance, the fewer the
number of drivers who will actually drive (and the shorter the trips they
will tend to take); thus, the amount of traffic volume demanded de-
creases as the cost of travel increases.'"







The curve labeled APC represents the average perceived costs to
roadway users."' Even at low levels of roadway usage (i.e., in the ab-
sence of congestion) roadway users experience some costs. 132 But these
costs will remain essentially stable (on a per unit basis) until congestion
develops (represented by the relatively flat APC curve to the left of the
point fc, where congestion develops). The presence of congestion in-
creases the costs of driving a given distance: certainly, the time required
to drive will increase, and it is likely too that the amounts of gasoline
and oil used, and general vehicle wear-and-tear, will increase with the
congestion level.'" This is represented by the upward slope of the APC
curve to the right of point fc .
150 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
131 Note that this curve, and the 'marginal total cost" curve described below, refer only
to variable costs of driving, not the fixed costs (such as automobile ownership). See, e.g.,
Johansson & Mansion, supra note 25, at 29 tb1.1.3 (distinguishing between fixed and vari-
able costs in this context).
132 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
133 See Wahrman, supra note 8, at 197.
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The curve labeled MC represents the actual marginal costs to road-
way users. The MC curve is coextensive with the APC curve for points to
the left of fc, reflecting the notion that actual congestion costs equal per-
ceived congestion costs where there is no congestion externality. The MC
curve slopes upward to the right of fc, for the same reasons that the APC
curve does: congestion leads to longer travel times, increased gasoline
and oil usage, and greater vehicle wear-and-tear. The MC curve, however,
rises more quickly than does the APC curve because the MC curve in-
cludes the costs that a new driver's entry has on all drivers.
In the absence of internalization of congestion costs, an equilibrium
will be reached at the point where the APC curve intersects the D curve.
As depicted in Figure 1, then, the equilibrium will involve a traffic flow of
fo at a unit cost of co. But if drivers were forced to internalize congestion
costs, the equilibrium that then would obtain would be at the intersec-
tion of the MC curve and the D curve: there would be traffic flow off' at a
unit cost of c*. Note, then, that the absence of internalization has the ef-
fect of both increasing the total traffic flow (because fo > r) and decreas-
ing the unit cost each driver faces (because c o < c'').134
In addition to misallocation of the resource and overusage, both
caused by the congestion externality, the congestion externality also
introduces some corollary effects.'" Congestion delays people and
goods from reaching their destinations and increases the frequency of
vehicular accidents.'" Congestion also imposes costs on the public at
large: traffic delays increase the amount of pollution that a vehicular
trip generates.' 37 One commentator estimates that "[s] top-and-go driv-
ing costs Americans an estimated $168 billion a year," of which "as
much as 15%, or $25 billion, falls on the public, in time lost by non-
motorists (walkers, cyclists, bus passengers) and municipal vehicles."'"
Congestion is also a source of road rage, which itself can lead to acci-
dents and other conflagrations) 39 In addition, the artificially low price
134 The figure does not capture the first effect of the negative externality: the inefli-
dent allocation of the resource (i.e., that the smaller number of vehicle miles in fact used
are probably allocated to different sets of drivers).
133 See, e.g., MCGILLIVRAY, supra note 9, at 2; Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1237.
136 MCGILLIVRAY, supra note 9, at 2 (listing "increased hazard" as a result of conges-
tion); Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1237.
137 Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1237.
133 Charles Komanoff, Pollution Taxes for Roadway Transportation, 12 PACE, ENVTL. L.
REv. 121, 129 (1994).
139
 Wahrman, supra note 8, at 182. But cf, Blomquist, supra note 9, at 36-37 (critiquing
Wahrman for ignoring causes of "road rage" other than traffic congestion). On the gen-
eral topic of "road rage," see generally Blomquist, supra note 9.
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of driving (because of the congestion externality) means that govern-
ment must subsidize mass transit substantially (i.e., even more than it
otherwise would have to) in order to induce people to utilize mass
transit. 140 In short, the deleterious effects of congestion on drivers, pas-
sengers, and society in general are substantial."'
It is possible that, in addition to negative externalities, the provi-
sion of roadway capacity may generate positive infrastructure external-
ities:142 For example, the availability of roadways (even with congestion)
may lead many people to engage in socially beneficial activities that
they otherwise might find too costly to undertake."' Indeed, these
benefits may accrue even to people who do not themselves directly
make use of the road system.'"
Nevertheless, relying upon such positive externalities as an effi-
ciency-based justification for providing more roadway capacity is dubi-
ous for two reasons. First, although such positive infrastructure spill-
overs may be difficult to measure, 145 it is questionable whether they are
large enough to outweigh the negative congestion externalities. Com-
mentators most often tout the size of positive infrastructure external-
ities, and emphasize the extent to which they are often underestimated,
in the context of ideas and intellectual property. As these commenta-
tors themselves acknowledge, however, ideas are essentially inexhausti-
142 See Charles J. Goetz, The Revenue Potential of User-Related Charges in State and Local
Governments, in BROAD-BASED TAXES: NEW OPTIONS AND SOURCES 113,122-23 (Richard A.
Musgrave ed., 1973) ("The relative use of mass transportation versus private vehicular
transportation is clearly affected by the respective prices of the two modes of transporta-
tion.... If ... vehicular traffic is underpriced, excessive traffic-congestion costs may sensi-
bly be avoided by underpricing the use of mass transportation.").
141 See, e.g, EMMERINK, supra note 9, at 3-4 ("[T] he costs of congestion are too large to
be ignored.").
Beyond clearly deleterious effects, such as those discussed in the text, congestion may
have other unanticipated effects on behavior. See, e.g., Francine Parnes, Business Travel;
Gaining Time and Clients While in the Pilot's Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,2003, at C8 (noting that
"many executives, frustrated by delays at commercial airports and on clogged interstates,"
are obtaining pilot licenses and buying private planes in order to ".beat the crowds").
142 See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917,970-78 (2005) (describing infrastructure effects, and
distinguishing them from network effects).
14'3
	 e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the
Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor l'oo, 47 Jutttiurrates J, 383,398
(2007); Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Dernsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. 1. &
EcoN. 649,669-70 (2007).
144 See Frischmann, supra note 142, at 973-74.
145 See id. at 975.
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ble, while roadways are not. 146
 Moreover, although new ideas may con-
tinue to be generated without concern, many areas are already so con-
gested that the continued construction of new roadway 'capacity be-
comes very costly or even practically impossible. Second, the decision
of whether to mandate internalization of congestion externalities does
not inform the separate question of whether roadway infrastructure
should be publicly financed. Put another way, the implementation of a
congestion pricing system would charge users a fee essentially only to
the extent of the congestion externality that they impose; government
financing of the infrastructure commons, and any positive spillover ef-
fects resulting therefrom, could persist. .
The next two Parts consider two governmental responses to traffic
congestion: the generation of additional roadway capacity and conges-
tion pricing. 147
III. THE DOMINANT RESPONSE TO TRAFFIC CONGESTION: THE
GENERATION OF ADDITIONAL ROADWAY CAPACITY
This Part examines the dominant governmental response to traffic
congestion: the generation of additional roadway capacity."8 First, it
elucidates ways in which the government might generate roadway ca-
pacity. 149 Second, it explains how generating additional roadway capac-
ity may be inefficient.'" Not only may the provision of new roadway
capacity not efficiently reduce traffic congestion, it may under some
circumstances worsen it. 151 Third, it discusses how, notwithstanding new
roadway capacity's efficiency shortcomings, public choice helps to ex-
plain its continued dominance as a governmental response. 152
Roadway capacity can be increased in different ways. First, the gov-
ernment might construct an entirely new roadway. Second, the gov-
ernment might construct new lanes on an existing roadway. Third, the
government might convert what previously had served as a "breakdown
lane" —that is, a shoulder lane that was designed to be used as a place
148 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 CoLum. L. REV. 257, 281
(2007). But see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 484-88 (2003) describing how congestion externalities may arise in
the context of intellectual property rights).
147 See infra notes 148-394 and accompanying text.
118 See infra notes 148-199 and accompanying text.
149 See infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
I" See infra notes 156-178 and accompanying text.
18I See infra notes 156-178 and accompanying text.
159 Sec infra notes 179-199 and accompanying text.
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to leave malfunctioning vehicles out of the path of traffic and perhaps
also to allow easy passage for police and other emergency vehicles—into
a lane'usable by ordinary vehicles. 153 Fourth, the government might have
lanes that reverse direction depending upon the extent of traffic flow
during different times of day.'" Fifth, the government might dedicate
particular lanes to "express use" (i.e., limited ability to enter into, and
leave from, those lanes to the rest of the expressway and other roads). 155
One author has noted that "ft] he traditional instrument to tackle
the congestion problem is to build more road infrastructure:156 But,
for several reasons, the generation of new roadway capacity is not as
attractive an option as it at first might seem.'" First, to the extent that
the new capacity does not eliminate, but merely ameliorates somewhat,
traffic congestion without reducing externalities, the resource will con-
tinue to be overused and not allocated efficiently among users. 158 Sec-
ond, "the social and environmental consequences of building new
roads could be far more severe than the beneficial effects to motor-
ists."159 Third, some urban areas are already so developed that it is
"physically impossible to enlarge the existing road infrastructure with-
out. undue expense. "160
Fourth, even putting the first two problems to the side, the fun-
damental justification for providing new roadway capacity—that it at
155 For example, the Interstate 95/Slate Route 128 highway in eastern Massachusetts
authorizes the use of the breakdown lane for ordinary traffic from 6:00 to 10:00 a.m. and
from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. every day.
154 For example, the Connecticut Avenue artery into Washington, D.C., features two
lanes that reverse direction: during rush hours, the two lanes go in the direction of heavy
traffic flow, while at other times one of the two lanes flows in each direction. The lower
level of New York City's Queensboro Bridge used to have five lanes, with the middle lane
switching direction during rush hours (some years ago the middle lane was eliminated
altogether). Also, the elevated Queens Midtown Expressway portion of the Long Island
Expressway features a dedicated "bus lane" (open to commuter buses and taxis with fares)
during the morning rush hour. The bus lane uses what is ordinarily one of the three out-
bound lanes of the expressway.
155 For example, Chicago's Dan Ryan Expressway has two express lanes that reverse di-
rection depending upon the time of day. Newiersey features express lanes on portions of
the New Jersey Turnpike (at no additional charge) and on portions of Interstate 78 (a free
road, both for local and express usage).
155 EMMERINK, supra note 9, at 4; accord GAO, DEVELOPING STRATEGIES, supra note 29,
at 40.
157 See, e.g., EMMERINK, supra note 9, at 4.
155 Sce supra notes 105-127 and accompanying text.
155 EMMERINK, supra note 9, at 4 (citation omitted).
1 e4 Id. An exception—probably made possible by a great concentration of power that is
probably unrealizable today—was Robert Moses's ability to build roads through existing
neighborhoods in New York City. See generally ROBERT A. CARO, Tut; POWER BROKER (197I).
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least ameliorates traffic congestion—is erroneous. 16' The logic underly-
ing new road construction rests upon the assumption that demand for
travel is essentially a function of demand for economic activities, ex-
ogenous to travel capacity (i.e., that demand for travel is substantially
inelastic to the time-cost of travel): "Planners have historically consid-
ered transportation demand as a derived demand for economic activi-
ties and have assumed that travelers will change their behavior as their
desire to engage in alternative activities changes over time."162 As com-
mentators explain, "[tl his leads to the assertion that capacity increases,
including increases in transit capacity, will be effective in reducing con-
gestion and are needed to account for exogenous growth in travel." 163
In other words, if travel demand is inelastic in relation to time-cost of
travel, then it stands to reason that new roads will reduce congestion. 16"
This notion is reflected in Figure 2, which presents an inelastic demand
curve, D, and two average perceived cost curves: APCO3 the initial aver-
age perceived cost of roadway usage, and APCI, the average perceived
cost of roadway usage after new construction. The rightward shift in the
APC curve from APC 0 to APC, results in a drop in the cost of travel
from co to ct, whereas traffic flow remains constant at level f.





161 Fulton et al., supra note 17, at 13.
162 Id. at 2; accord Noland & Cowart, supra note 17, at 369.
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This result may seem intuitive. In fact, however, recent research find-
ings suggest that it is not the case at all. 165 This is because of the phe-
nomenon of "induced travel."'"
Induced travel is the notion that new road construction spurs new
demand for travel, such that in the end, congestion on the newly ex-
panded road system is no better, and indeed perhaps is even worse,
than it was before. 167 Lewis Fulton, Robert Noland, Daniel Meszler, and
John Thomas conducted a study on vehicle-miles traveled in the mid-
Atlantic region of the United States.' 68 Their data analysis indicates "a
significant relationship between the level of highway capacity ... and
the level of travel. "l 6
The model described above (and depicted in Figure 2) failed to
take into account the "induced travel" phenomenon because that
model took a static view: it assumed that the total number of vehicle
miles would not change simply upon the construction of new road-
ways. 17° Instead, as Figure 1 indicated, the demand for travel is probably
downward sloping. As such, a rightward shift in the roadway supply
curve resulting from new road construction instead should have the
effect indicated in Figure 3: though the cost of travel does decrease—
from co to c1—the decrease will not be as large as it would be if in fact
demand for travel were substantially inelastic to roadway supply. More-
over, unlike Figure 2, Figure 3 predicts that new road construction
should result in an increase in traffic flow, from fo to
165 Sae id. at 13.
166 See id. at 2-3.
167 Id. The legal academic literature has taken limited notice of induced travel de-
mand. See Salvatore Massa, Surface Ftright Transportation: Accounting for Subsidies in a Free
Marker, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. Pot.'v 285, 330 (2001); Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart
Growth: The Promise, Politics, and Potential Pitfalls of Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19
VA. ENVTL. 247, 266 n.64 (2000); Gilbert Paul Verbit, The Urban Transportation Problem,
124 U. PA. L. REv. 368, 390 (1975).
166 See generally Fulton et al., supra note 17.
169 Id. at 13. The study measures highway capacity in lane-miles and level of travel in













The phenomenon of induced travel has an even more pro-
nounced effect over time. 171 Logic suggests that new roadway construe-
don might spur new land development—leading, for example, to more
commuters or more businesses to which existing residents commute—
and also might create incentives for current residents to purchase addi-
tional N'ehicles. 172 In short, "long term responses to increased access can
result in changes in land use patterns, possibly inducing both more and
longer trips." This could result in an upward shift in the travel de-
mand curve over time, as reflected in Figure 4. With equilibrium now
occurring at the intersection of average perceived cost AFC ' and de-
mand curve D I , some of the original reduction in cost of travel (from co
to c i ) are lost as the time-cost rises to c2. Further, traffic flow rises again,
this dine to level f2.
171 See id. at 3,
172 see id,
172 Fulton et al., supra note 17, at 3. On the links between land use, roadways, and con-
gestion, see generally Rachel Weinberger, The High Cost of Free Highways, 43 InAno L. Rev.
475 (2007).




Moreover, depending upon the time-elasticity of demand to road-
way capacity, the effect of induced travel could be even worse. Assume, as
reflected in Figure 5, induced travel over time shifts the demand curve
not to D 1 , but rather to B2. Now, not only has traffic flow increased to f3 ,
well above •the original fo level, but also the cost of travel is c 3—higher
than the co level that obtained before the new construction. In other
words, congestion itself has worsened as a result of the new construction.
FIGURE 5
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It is conceivable that the increase in growth that follows road con-
struction is not the result of road construction.'74 It is possible that the
growth would have occurred anyway. 175 If that is so, then the new road
construction was simply an accurate anticipation of the growth, in
which case society is better off with the new construction than it would
be without it (as the growth would have happened either way). Recent
empirical studies, however, although they are not conclusive, generally
suggest otherwise. 176
In sum, the phenomenon of induced travel appears to be an em-
pirically accurate description of the response to new road construction:
increased travel demand.'" As such, new road construction as a pure
strategy in response to congestion seems questionable. And, depending
upon the extent of elasticity of travel demand to roadway supply, such a
pure strategy may be ill-advised, as it may function only to worsen the
congestion problem over time.' 78
Even though new road construction is not a cost-effective way to
address the problem of traffic congestion, it still remains a popular
government response to the problem of congestion. 179 Part of the
popularity of the new road construction strategy may be due to urban
planners' erroneous belief that demand for travel is substantially inelas-
174 See Patricia L. Mokhtarian et al., Revisiting the Notion of Induced Traffic Through a
Matched-Pairs Study, 29 TittotseolerimoN 193, 214 (2002) (finding no evidence of induced
travel demand).
174 See id.
176 See Fulton et al., supra note 17, at 13 (noting that study results "[o]verall ... provide
a strong indication that growth in lane-miles is exogenous and therefore causes the growth
in [vehicle-miles traveled]"); Noland & Cowart, supra note 17, at 387 (noting that study
results "are highly suggestive of a causal linkage" between lane-mile additions and growth
in vehicle-miles traveled); Noland, supra note 17, at 70 (noting that study results suggest
"[Overall ... that ... the induced travel effect is accounting for a quarter of... growth" in
vehicle-miles traveled); ef. James Traub, Harvard Radical, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003 (Maga-
zine), at 28, 32 (describing Harvard President and economist Lawrence Summers' child-
hood recollection that "if the family ... was stuck in traffic, one of his parents [both of
whom were economists) might ask, If there was one more lane, would that eliminate the
traffic jam or simply increase the number of drivers who used the road?'"). But see Mok-
htarian et al., supra note 174, at 214 (using "matched-pairs" technique (i.e., "comparing
traffic growth on improved segments against growth on 'similar' unimproved (control)
segments") and "finding no evidence of induced [travel] demand"). That travel demand
depends upon cost is demonstrated by the increase in New York City bus ridership follow-
ing the introduction of free transfers to buses from the subways. See Thomas J. Lueck, New
York's Bus Ridership Surges After Long Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1998, at Al (identifying
discounts as one reason for the surge in bus ridership).
177 See Fulton et al., supra note 17, at 3; Noland & Cowart, supra note 17, at 387.
176 See Fulton et al., supra note 17, at 3.
179 SEC EMMERINR, supra note 9, at 4; GAO, DEVELOPING STRATEGIES, supra note 29, at 40.
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tic to the time-cost of trave1. 188 Public choice theory, however, offers
another, seemingly stronger, reason for government's emphasis on new
road construction.
Many societal actors—and, in particular, many societal actors who
readily can form cohesive, powerful interest groups—are likely to sup-
port new road construction. First, even if economic theory suggests that
new road construction may not be effective to combat congestion (and
indeed even may worsen it), the fact remains that residents of an area
that rely on a congested roadway for their travel needs believe that new
construction will reduce congestion. 181 Second, industry actors that en-
gage in road construction and real estate construction will support
such projects. 182 And. because many of those employees are union
members, organized labor is likely to support new road construction.
In addition, new road construction is likely to be a financial boon
to landowners, businesses, and developers. 183 For example, the con-
struction of an entirely new road is likely to increase land values along
the path of the new road. 184 This will likely lead to increased profits for
business owners located along the new road and also likely create work
for land developers. 185 The same is likely to be true (though perhaps to
a lesser degree) for the addition of new lanes to an existing roadway.
• Some societal actors may be opposed to a particular road construc-
tion project. For example, business owners along a trafficked highway
may oppose the construction of an alternative highway route for fear
that the reduction in traffic on the existing route will translate into lost
profits. 188 Environmental organizations and organizations that advocate
land use planning also may oppose new road construction. It seems
likely, however, that in many cases public choice theory would predict
188 See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text; supra Figure 2.
181 This disconnect is between theory and belief can generally be accounted for by two
assumptions of economic theory: that "[i]ndividual behavior is rational, based on utility
maximisation" and that "[t]here is full information on all costs involved for road us-
ers." See EMMER INK, supra note 9, at 37.
182 Cf. Buzbee, supra note 7, at 80; Oliver Houck, Unfinished Stories, 73 U. Cow. L. REV.
867, 897-98 (2002) (describing the large industrial interests reliant upon heavy usage of
the automobile).
' 83 See, e.g., Kilborn, supra note 30.
184 See id.
186 See id.
186 This opposition may be tempered somewhat by the fact that the reduction in con-
gestion on the original route may actually encourage some people to travel to, and patron-
ize, the existing businesses.
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that the many powerful, well-organized special interests that support
new road construction would far outweigh the few that oppose it. 187
Government actors are also likely to support new road construc-
tion projects.' New road construction has been described as the quin-
tessential form of political pork. 189
 Politicians can increase their power
base by doling out road construction projects.'" The public is also
likely to appreciate the public spending as a boost to the local economy
(especially if, as is often the case, the money used to finance the project
is from a government level far removed from the local level, i.e., the
federal government). Additionally, to the extent that, as noted above,
constituents understand (even if erroneously) new road construction to
ameliorate congestion, politicians can claim that they are doing some-
thing to address the problem of traffic congestion.
When examined through the lens of David Mayhew's reelection-
focused approach to political actors,t 9 t the propensity for government
to back new road construction becomes even clearer. Mayhew argues
that legislators are career politicians motivated substantially by a desire
to be repeatedly reelected. 192
 Accordingly, he argues that "congressmen
must constantly engage in activities related to reelection."t"s Among the
activities that Mayhew identifies that further reelection prospects—and
in which legislators therefore reasonably should be expected to en-
gage—is "credit claiming," or, in other words, "acting so as to generate
a belief in a relevant political actor (or actors) that one is personally
responsible for causing the government, or some unit thereof, to do
something that the actor (or actors) considers desirable."'"
187 See, e.g.. Buzbee, supra note 7, at 80-81 (noting the interest in government transporta-
tion infrastructure of construction agencies and residential, retail, and mall developers).
188 See, e.g.. Dilger, supra note 13, at 50.
189 See id.; Michael Lyons. Political Self-Interest and U.S. Environmental Policy, 39 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 271, 284 (1999); David EL Rosenbloom, 1946: Framing a Lasting Congressional
Response to the Administrative State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 187 (1998).
190
 As Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum commented during the Senate debate over
the then-pending Safe, Accountable, Flexible and Efficient Transportation Equity Act, "'Never
get between a congressman and asphalt, because you will always get run over.'" Christopher
Lee, Highway Bill Passes Senat4 Faces Opposition from Bush, WASH. POST', Feb. 13, 2004, at A4.
191
 See generally MAYnEw, supra note 71, at 14-17.
195
 See id. David R. Mayhew formally restricts his argument to federal legislators, but his
arguments in this regard readily translate in at least a fairly robust form to the setting of
state and even local legislators today. See id. at 13, 25.
195 Id. at 49.
194 Id. at 52-53. Mayhew identifies two other activities that are likely to lead to reelec-
tion: '`advertising" and 'position taking." See id. at 49, 61.
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Mayhew expounds that legislators most prevalently engage in
credit claiming by doling out "particularized benefits," which satisfy two
conditions:
(1) Each benefit is given out to a specific individual, group, or
geographical constituency, the recipient unit being of a scale
that allows a single congressman to be recognized (by relevant
political actors and other congressmen) as the claimant for
the benefit (other congressmen being perceived as indifferent
or hostile). (2) Each benefit is given out in apparently ad hoc
fashion (unlike, say, social security checks) with a congress-
man apparently having a hand in the allocation)"
Roadway construction projects provide a clear example of a par-
ticularized benefit. 196 A roadway project benefits (or at least appears to
benefit) specific individuals: residents who believe that traffic conges-
tion woes will be lessened, road construction firms and workers, and
the real estate construction and sales industries)" Because roadway
construction projects are hardly handed out like social security checks,
legislators credibly can claim (where appropriate) that they had a hand
in their allocation)" In short, the political popularity of highway con-
struction projects is not surprising.
In the end, the pure strategy of new road construction is not a
cost-effective way to address the problem of traffic congestion; indeed,
it may even be counterproduCtive in the long run. 199 Nonetheless, pub-
lic choice theory suggests that it is likely to remain a popular govern-
ment response to the problem.
IV. THE EFFICIENT RESPONSE TO TRAFFIC CONGESTION:
CONGESTION PRICING
Congestion pricing is an efficient, market-based response to the
problem of traffic congestion. 2" This Part presents an overview of con-
1" Id. at 54.
196
	 supra note 71, at 54.
197 See Buzbee, supra note 7, at 80.
198 See MAYHew, supra note 71, at 54.
199 See Fulton et al., supra note 17, at 3.
"9 Market-based approaches to congestion control effectively assign a price to roadway
access and then rely upon prospective users to decide whether to pay the price and access
the road. In this way, the scarce resource is allocated to those who value it most. See Jona-
than Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108
YALE L.J. 677, 714-15 (1999).
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There are two possible market-based approaches other than congestion pricing. First,
the converse of congestion pricing is a system that subsidizes travel during less congested
periods: The subsidy acts as a negative tax because failing to abate means incurring the
cost of forgoing the subsidy." Id. at 726. As such, "[s] ubsidies can in principle achieve cost-
effective abatement." Id.
The Maryland Transportation Authority experimented with a subsidy-based approach
to traffic congestion in 2003. The Authority proposed "to ease Friday afternoon backups
for beachgoers at the Chesapeake Bay Bridge by getting private businesses to pay the tolls
from 7:00 p.m. Fridays until 7:00 a.m. Saturdays." No Takers for Tolls-for-Ads Plan, WASH.
Pos•'''. Apr. 23. 2003, at B3. In exchange for the toll payments, a sponsoring business was
offered the chance to "advertise[] at toll plazas. tollbooths and state traffic Web sites." Id.
Ultimately, only another branch of state government—the lottery agency—undertook
sponsorship. See Coming and Going: Road min- Drive Time, WASH. PosT, June 29, 2003, at P1
(noting that free eastbound passage across the bridge was to be available July Fourth,
"courtesy of the Maryland Lottery"); Christian Davenport & Anita Huslin, By All Means,
Keep Traffic Moving, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2003, at T2; No Takers for Tolls-for-Ads Plan, supra.
A more encompassing traffic subsidy proposal, also in the Washington, D.C., metropoli-
tan area, is one designed to reduce traffic across the "Woodrow Wilson Bridge. The bridge,
which spans the Potomac River between Virginia and Washington, serves as a major com-
muter artery. Under the program, dubbed "BridgeBucks," participants will receive compen-
sation for not taking the bridge. Steven Ginsberg, Plan to Pay Motorists to Get Off Bridge: Wilson
Officials Hope to Ease Jams, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 2004, at Bl. To be eligible, "drivers must pass
through part of the project corridor as they commute to work or school." Id. Each participant
will receive "the equivalent of $50 a month in the form of Metro passes or bus passes, or the
money will be sent directly to vanpool operators to subsidize the riders' fares." Id. The pro-
gram, which will last for at least one year, will be open to "the first 1,000 commuters who
qualify, 500 from Virginia and 500 from Maryland," and will involve "a first-year cost of about
$745,000." Id.
Subsidy options are generally disfavored insofar as it seems normatively preferable to
charge actors for engaging in an activity that imposes costs on others rather than to pay ac-
tors not to engage in the activity. See Wiener, supra. at 726. Analogizing to the setting of envi-
ronmental law, a subsidy-based approach runs afoul of the "polluter pays" principle, a norma-
tive notion that urges that pollution costs be borne by those who generate the pollution and
associated harm. SeeJonathan Remy Nash, Too Aluch Matitet? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution
Allowances and the "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24 HARV. Entria... L. Rev. 465, 467-80 (2000) (dis-
cussing and analyzing various interpretations of the principle); cf. Kenneth J. Button & Erik
1. Verhoef, introduction to ROAD PRICING, TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND 'I11E ENVIRONMENT:
ISSUES OF EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL FEASIBILrlY 3, 4 (Kenneth J. Button & Erik T. Verhoef
eds., 1998) [hereinafter ROAD PRICING, TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT] (not-
ing that environmental law's "polluter pays principle" has its origins in early treatments of
congestion pricing). Given the additional fact of the Maryland program's inability to attract a
sponsor other than another government agency, the future for noncongestion subsidy pro-
grams does not seem bright. But cf, infra note 271 and accompanying text (describing "Fast
and Intertwined Regular" lanes regimes as a hybrid between a congestion charge and subsidy
system).
One might also think of another possible market-based response to the congestion prob-
lem: a tradable roadway access permit regime. See infra note 373 (describing a proposal that is
somewhat similar to such a system). Congestion pricing is a price-control mechanism; the
price-control analog to congestion pricing would be a transferable road access permit system.
Assuming similar instrument structure, that the market functions frictionlessly, and that the
government's access to information is perfect, both regimes should give rise to the same level
of pollution and impose the same cost on polluters. See Wiener, supra, at 715.
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gestion pricing. 201 First, it briefly summarizes the theoretical and practi-
cal history of congestion pricing. 202 Second, it describes in the abstract
both the logic underlying a congestion charge system and how such
systems can be structured; it identifies two axes along which congestion
pricing schemes might be categorized and thus develops a typology of
congestion pricing regimes. 203 Next, it describes the current, limited
federal role in fostering congestion pricing regimes. 204 It then briefly
surveys existing congestion pricing regimes, both domestic and foreign,
before ending with an examination of the economics and public choice
of congestion pricing. 205
A. Brief History
Problems of congestion in transportation were the subject of study
of early neoclassical economists seeking to shed light on the problem of
market failure. 206 Arsêne Jules Etienne Dupuit undertook to determine
the optimal toll for a bridge in 1844. 207 Arthur Cecil Pigott208 and Frank
Knight209 investigated the problem of roadway congestion in the 1920s.
Both of these "spiritual fathers of road pricing" recommended that
drivers internalize the external congestion costs that, their road usage
Four problems present design challenges for the implementation of a tradable road-
way access permit regime. First, because a tradable roadway access permit scheme would
cap the total number of vehicles allowed on a given road at a given time, it is possible that
some people will simply be unable to purchase roadway access; at least with a congestion
pricing scheme, newcomers have the option of paying the charge (even if it is high) and
gaining access. Second, for what period of time would a roadway access permit remain
valid? Third, where, how, and at what degree of difficulty and cost would people trade the
permits? Fourth, how would the system be designed to confront the possibility of traffic
"hot spots?" CI Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing
Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 EcoLocv L.Q. 569,580
(2001) (discussing "hot spots" in the context of pollution).
251 See infra notes 202-394 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 206-217 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 218-273 and accompanying text.
204 See infra notes 274-335 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 336-394 and accompanying text.
Zoe
	 & Verhoef, supra note 200, at 4.
"7 1 Dupuit, On the Measurement of the Utility of Public Ilbrits, 8 ANNALES	 PONTS ET
CIIAUSSEES (2d sec 1844), reprinted in TRANSPORT: SELECTED READINGS 38-43 (Denys
Munby ed., R. H. Barback trans., 1968).
2" See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 63 (1920).
gas
	
F.H. Knight, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q.J. ECON. 582,
584-85 (1924).
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imposed.21° Frank Plumpton Ramsey also advocated the use of taxes to
address road congestion in 1927. 211
If Pigou and Knight are the "spiritual fathers" of congestion pric-
ing, then Nobel Laureate William Vickrey was "the pioneer in [its]
practical application."212 Vickrey first suggested congestion pricing in a
study commissioned to revamp the New York City subway system.m He
then recommended the use of congestion pricing in the Washington,
D.C. area, 214 testifying before Congress on the matter in 1958. 215 In the
ensuing decades, he wrote numerous articles advocating the use of
congestion pricing regimes and explaining how they could be imple-
mented practically.216
Despite Vickrey's longstanding and strenuous support, congestion
pricing remained only a theoretical construct for many years. The suc-
cessful implementation of a congestion pricing program in Singapore
in the mid-1970s spurred Congress, filially, in 1990 to authorize pilot
congestion pricing programs in the United States. 217 Even now, how-
ever, congestion pricing regimes remain clearly the exception rather
than the rule.
B. Fundamental Logic and Typolop,
Congestion pricing is a species of road pricing. 218 Road pricing has
been described as "charging for the direct use of the road." 219 Fees may
be placed on road access for a variety of reasons—including recovery of
the cost of constructing the road, recovery of the costs of maintaining
21° Button & Verhoef, supra note 200, at 4.
211 See F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 EcoN. J. 47, 59 (1927).
212 Richard Arnott, Pricing Urban Transportation: Introduction, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS:
SELECTED PAPERS BY WILLIAM VICICREY 271, 271 (Richard Arnott et al. eds., 1994); sec also
Wahrman, supra note 8, at 181 n." (dedicating article to Vickrey, an early and lonely
champion of congestion pricing").
219 See generally WILLIAM S. VICKREY, 'DIE REVISION or nil. Ramo TRANSIT FARE STRUC-
TURE OF 'HIE CITY OF NEW 'YORK (1952).
214 See Arnott, supra note 212, at 272.
216 See Straltilevitz, supra note 9, at 1249; Wahrman, supra note 8, at 182 n.5.
216 See, e.g., Arnim, supra note 212, at 272-75.
217 Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1249. For a description of the federal role in spurring
the development of congestion pricing regimes, see infra notes 274-335 and accompany-
ing text.
218 SecJohansson & Mattsson, supra note 25, at 7.
219 Id. Road pricing itself is a subspecies of the broader category of road user
charges—that is, the "spectrum of methods to collect money from road users, e.g. gasoline
and vehicle ownership taxes." Id.
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and upgrading the road, 220 subsidizing mass transportation, 221 or simply
providing a source of government revenue. 222 Congestion charging en-
visions the imposition of fees solely as "an instrument to manage travel
demand and guide/control traffic flows."225 Congestion pricing schemes
are generally designed to mandate the internalization of the congestion
externality. 224
220 For example, on the New Jersey Turnpike, "[t] oll for travel between interchanges is
determined by the cost of construction and maintenance of the roadway between these
points." TRUCK TOLL REPORT 2005 at 15, littp://www.nymtc.org/files/Truck_Toll_Report_
2005_,Partl_Text.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).
Note that, effective July 9, 2003, the New Jersey Highway Authority (which adminis-
tered New Jersey's Garden State Parkway) was folded into the New Jersey Turnpike Author-
ity. See 2003 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 79 (West); Garden State Parkway, http://www.gspkwy.
state.nj.us (last visited Mar. 9, 2008) (noting that "[e]ffective ... 2003 all of the duties,
obligations and powers of the New Jersey Highway Authority were transferred to the New
Jersey Turnpike Authority," and redirecting to http://www.state.nj.us/turnpike) . A press
release from New Jersey's governor proclaims that, as a result, "more money is now available
for projects to improve the roads." Press Release, N.J. Tpk. Auth., Governor McGreevey An-
nounces Planned Improvements from Turnpike Authority Consolidation ( July 10, 2003),
available at http://www.state.nj.us/turnpike/msgfromgov.hun.
221 For example, New York's "Bridges and Tunnels" ("B&T") is a "constituent agency of
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority." Metro. Transp. Auth., Welcome to MTA
Bridges and Tunnels, http://www.inta.nyc.ny.us/bandt/hunl/btintro.htm (last visited Mar.
9, 2008). B&T's "dual role is to operate seven bridges and two tunnels and to provide sur-
plus toll revenues to help support public transit." Id. The cross-subsidization of public
transit with bridge and tunnel tolls dates back to the 1960s:
By the 1960s the city was becoming choked by automobile congestion and
pollution, and the need to restore long neglected subway, bus, and commuter
rail systems became apparent. Accordingly, in 1968 the Triborough Bridge
and Tunnel Authority was made part of the MTA. Its surplus revenues, previ-
ously used to finance new projects for the automobile, were redirected to
public transportation. Since that time, bridge and tunnel tolls have contrib-
uted more than $12 billion to subsidize fares and underwrite capital im-
provements for New York City Transit, the Long Island Rail Road, and the
Metro-North Railroad. Total toll revenues, more than $1 billion annually, and
Bridges and Tunnels' Five Year Capital Program will keep its facilities among
the best maintained in the region.
Id.
222 E.g., McGiu.tvuio , supra note 9, at 1 ("Through most of history the justification for
[toll charges] has been either to generate income or profit or to pay the costs of providing
a facility which smooth [e]s the way for passage.").
223 See johansson & Mattsson, supra note 25, at 7-8 ("When road pricing is used as an
instrument to manage travel demand and guide/control traffic flows it is called congestion
pricing."). To the extent that a fee is imposed for more than one reason, this Article refers
to the fee as a "congestion charge" only to the extent that it is imposed to effect internali-
zation of the congestion externality
224 See id. at 8 ("Road pricing is often introduced as a method to internalise the exter-
nalities generated by road use, thereby removing the external effects caused by car drivers.
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Congestion pricing regimes seek to remedy the externality of con-
gestion in a straightforward way: by charging drivers for access to the
roadways at issue. 225 As detailed below, this seemingly simple definition
harbors considerable ambiguity—ambiguity that affords freedom in
designing congestion pricing schemes—but the fundamental point re-
mains that congestion pricing regimes seek to mitigate the externality
by directly requiring cost internalization. 226
The use of congestion pricing regimes for roadway use is similar to
the use of peak pricing regimes for other goods and services with which
consumers are already familiar.227 The benefits of application of peak
pricing to roadway access are clear: "Congestion pricing assesses vehi-
cles for the congestion and the time losses they impose on other road-
way users. In doing so, congestion pricing can dampen and flatten the
demand to use roads, thereby reducing the aggregate loss of drivers'
time and also defraying the need to expand road capacity. "228 In addi-
tion, congestion pricing "not only sends out the right signals to motor-
ists, but it yields a transfer of resources that could be used by the road
authority to enhance community welfare."229 Also, unlike command-
and-control approaches, 2" congestion pricing regimes afford societal
actors maximum flexibility in determining their travel itineraries. 291
The charges are directed towards the congestion and other road damage externalities
caused by motorists.").
225 See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1235 (concisely defining "congestion pricing"
as "an approach that seeks to decrease congestion by charging motorists tolls that vary
based on the levels of traffic congestion at a given time").
225 See infra notes 227-273 and accompanying text.
227 See Komanoff, supra note 138, at 132; Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1244. For a theo-
retical overview of peak pricing, see W. Kw VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION
AND ANTITRUST 396-403 (2d ed. 1998).
228 Komanoff, supra note 138, at 131.
225 Timothy D. Hau, Instruments for Charging Congestion Externalities, in ROAD PRICING,
supra note 25, at 223,224.
230 Sec infra note 397.
231 Harry Richardson and Chang-Hee Bae explain that the options among which indi-
viduals may choose under a congestion pricing regime include:
[Mc) change in travel behavior (that is, paying the charges); increasing travel
(because trip times on formerly congested roads are now reduced); unchanged
travel behavior combined with attempts to reduce total automobile costs (for
example, keeping vehicle longer, or replacing it with a cheaper or more fuel-
efficient vehicle); changing travel behavior with the same level of tripmaking
(for example, changing trip time, route, or mode, such as carpools, transit); re-
duce tripmaking (for example, trip chaining, telecommuting, or simply travel-
ing less); and changes in location (for example, residence, workplace shopping
destination).
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Congestion pricing structures can be seen to Vary along two axes.
First, one must determine how the price for road access is deter-
mined.232 Second, one must examine what other options (i.e., substi-
tutes) are available to persons who choose not to pay for road access and
how those options are priced.
An understanding of how congestion pricing should theoretically
be set is not difficult. As shown in Figure 1 above, the congestion ex-
ternality arises because of a discrepancy between the "average perceived
costs" faced by motorists and the total "marginal costs" to which driving
gives rise. It is appropriate to impose a congestion charge sufficient to
ensure that drivers in fact take into account the actual total marginal
costs. 233 This means that congestion charges should be set equal to the
excess of marginal costs over average perceived costs. 234 Because the
purpose of congestion pricing is to internalize the congestion external-
ity, a congestion pricing scheme .should impose no charge where there
is no congestion.235 Congestion has a "collective (social) effect" where
Harry W. Richardson & Chang-Hee Christine Bae. The Equity Impacts of Road Congestion
Pricing, in ROAD PRICING, TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 200, at
247, 247-48.
232 Peter Jones breaks the pricing question down into finer distinctions:
1. - Who.should be charged?
2. How much should they pay?
3. Where should they be charged?
4. When should they be charged?
5. How should they be charged?
Peter Jones, Urban Road Pricing: Public Acceptability and Barriers to Implementation, in ROAD
PRICING, TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 200, at 263, 277; see id.
at 277-80.
233 See Hau, supra note 99, at 58.
231 See id. ("It is th(el amount of external congestion cost—or time cost expressed in
money terms—that the government ought to charge for. The marginal external cost is the
difference between the (short-run) marginal cost and the average (variable) cost of a trip."
(citation omitted)); Johanison & Mattsson, supra note 25, at 13. But see Phil B. Goodwin, Road
Pricing or Transport Planning?, in ROAD PRICING, supra note 25, at 143, 149 (arguing that,
though congestion pricing regimes are generally a good idea, actually imposing internaliza-
tion of congestion costs might not be optimal); Komanoff, supra note 138, at 132-33 (argu-
ing that, because "the objective is not necessarily to eliminate all congestion, but to maximize
the net benefits from society's economic resources, including not only time but capital in-
vested in roads[,] ... the appropriate level of congestion pricing is probably far less" than
total external congestion costs (citation omitted)).
235 SeeJohansson & Mattsson, supra note 25, at 10-11 (explaining that where "there are
no congestion effects ... there are no efficiency or welfare arguments" in favor of impos-
ing a charge); Komanoff, supra note 138, at 132 ("Motorists using uncongested rural roads
would not pay congestion fees.").
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"marginal social cost is higher and increases faster than the average in-
dividual cost."236
A pure congestion pricing system would take into account the ex-
isting traffic conditions and how the new entrant's travel will adversely
affect traffic conditions. 237 In theory, then, a congestion pricing scheme
should vary price according to the extent to which, on a going-forward
basis, the new entrant's driving contributes to congestion. 238 Thus, tin-
der the pure approach, the total cost of a trip should depend upon
changing traffic conditions during the trip. 239 There is a practical prob-
lem here: the total cost of the trip could not be determined in ad-
vance. 24° Part of the benefit offered by congestion pricing, however, is
that prospective roadway users might consider congestion cost associ-
ated with a trip in advance. In this sense, it is preferable if the conges-
tion pricing scheme sets a fixed price in advance of the trip. 24 ' Thus,
practicality may require sacrifice of the purity of a congestion pricing
regime. 242
To allow for the establishment of a fixed price for a trip, a conges-
tion pricing scheme can use historical data on traffic patterns to antici-
pate the externalized cost that one would expect the new entrant's
travel to generate. In this sense, setting a congestion charge presents an
238 Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 25, at IL




241 Note, however, that other variable costs, such as gasoline, oil, and general vehicle
wear-and-tear, may vary considerably depending upon traffic conditions. To that extent,
drivers often may be forced to decide whether or not to undertake a trip (or to use a par-
ticular route) without full knowledge of the total cost of the trip.
242 Phil Goodwin explicates:
['Mere is a balance between theoretical purity and practical usefulness. In
principle, the road pricing argument can be extended to show that a vehicle
at the front of a queue should be charged more than one at the back, and
that charging rates should vary by the minute, or even [the] second, in re-
sponse to the constantly changing intrusiveness of traffic in urban streets. In
practice, there is a limit to how finely it is useful to specify charges—and in-
deed a strong argument that charges should be predictable, and known to
the motorist before a journey is started. The result is that most road pricing
exercises plan some sort of simplified system where charges vary by period of
the day, and by geographical area or part of the network, but in rather broad
bands which therefore necessarily average out some of the potential refine-
ments, and lose the moral high ground of a theoretical optimum.
Goodwin, supra note 234, at 148.
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easier chore for a regulator than the task of setting a Pigouvian tax in
most other settings.
Reliance upon historical data, however, does not resolve the pric-
ing issue. 243 To price a trip properly, the congestion pricing scheme
should take into account some aspect of the traveler's journey. There
are several ways that this can be achieved. First, the driver somehow
might indicate his anticipated route in advance of his trip; 2" a problem
arises, however, if the . driver changes his or her path en route.
Second, the congestion pricing scheme might use distance trav-
eled as a measure of contribution to congestion. Such an approach
might entail the system recording the locations at which a driver enters
and exits the road subject to pricing and then pricing the trip accord-
ing to that information. 245 The approach also could be achieved by hav-
ing a device that measures actual distances traveled on the restricted
road; data from that device would be obtained by the government and
used to price the roadway usage. 246
A third possibility would be to use time spent on a road as a proxy
for contribution to congestion on the road. Here, the system would re-
cord the times at which a driver enters and exits the restricted road.
Each of these possibilities requires the government to obtain data
for each driver's trip on each occasion that the driver takes a trip. Tech-
nological advances make these possibilities far more feasible than they
previously were,247 but nonetheless they remain complex and somewhat
243 Id.
244 This would be akin to a 'flight plan" filed by a pilot.
245 Many state toll roads employ pricing systems that, although they are not congestion
pricing schemes, vary tolls according to the entrance and exit used by drivers. See supra
note 220 (discussing the setting of tolls on the New Jersey Turnpike).
246 See generally KIRAN BlIATT, ROAD PRICING TECHNOLOGIES: A SURVEY (1974). Such a
device would be akin to a meter used by taxicabs in many metropolitan areas.
242 See DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY 67-84 (2002) (discussing the rela-
tionship between technology capabilities and design and development of environmental
regulatory tools); Nash Be Revesz, supra note 200, at 637-50 (describing how computerized
pollution dispersion models and the internet can facilitate more nuanced air pollutant per-
mit trading programs); cf. EMMERINK, supra note 9, at 45 (Although "the costs of implement-
ing and maintaining a congestion-pricing system should not be underestimated," "recent
evidence indicated that, for high density, highly congested regions, these may be relatively
low."). Compare BuA•r, supra note 246, at 7-20 (surveying then-existing technological op-
tions), and Goetz, supra note 140, at 118 (describing road pricing on trunk highways as "fea-
sible" but pricing city streets as Impractical" "[Oven the present technology," but also not-
ing that "it is not impossible to imagine the development of electronic monitoring devices
that would bring almost-universal road-usage pricing within the realm of practicality"), with
Wahrman, supra note 8, at 196 (noting that "(i] t is only recently that the concept [of conges-
tion pricing} became administratively feasible with the introduction of electronic tolls and
computerized toll cards"). For a discussion of the ethical implications of scientific innovation
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costly. Other options exist that are less complex and costly, although
they require sacrifice of accuracy in pricing to achieve those ends.
First, a congestion pricing scheme can be simplified by charging a
uniform price for use of the road (i.e., by charging on a per use basis,
without regard to distance traveled or time spent on the road). To the
extent that the pricing system is designed to address congestion, the
system still would take into account somehow the extent to which a new
entrant contributes to existing congestion conditions. Presumably, such
a system would charge all drivers the average congestion price. One
might expect, therefore, that drivers of shorter trips would subsidize
drivers of longer trips under such a system, with the possible result that
short-trip drivers would avoid the road and long-trip drivers would
overuse it. Such a distortion might result in inefficiently high conges-
tion levels (at least in the short-term, until pricing caught up with the
changed use of the road). In other words, true pricing might lead to
adverse selection of roadway users.
Another simplifying step is to use the time of day as a proxy for
congestion conditions, without regard to what actual congestion condi-
tions are at any given moment. 248 The most common version seen in .
congestion pricing schemes is simply to price roadway access at a higher
rate during prevalent "rush hours."249 For example, the government
might charge a higher toll from 6:00 to 10:00 a.m. every weekday morn-
ing into a city, and from 4:00 to 8:00 p.m. every weekday evening out of
the city. 25° Indeed, the city might charge no toll in nonpeak hours. For
example, London has recently implemented a congestion pricing
scheme for permission to drive in the central city. 251 The scheme im-
on environmental policy, see generally Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation and Environmental
Protection: Some Ethical Considerations, 32 ENvIt,. L. 755 (2002).
248 The idea of using historical congestion data is a more nuanced version of this sim-
plifying step. See supra notes 241-247 and accompanying text.
249 See generally MARTIN G. RICHARDS, CONGESTION CHARGING IN LONDON: THE POLICY
AND THE Pourrics (2006) (detailing London's scheme of charging motorists to enter the
center city during "rush hours").
230 In the public transit context, the "Metrorail" subway system in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area charges higher fees for travel during morning and evening rush hours.
See Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., Fares & Passes, http://www.wmata.com/riding/hours_
fares.cfm#Metrorail%20Fares (2008). William Vickrey originally advocated congestion pric-
ing for use in public transportation—specifically, the New York City subway system. See supra
note 213 and accompanying text; cf. Patrick Healy, Rises in Fares and Costs Give Cabbies Mixed
Feelings, NY. TIMES, May 3, 2004, at B3 ("Riders [in taxis] will ... have to pay a new $1 sur-
charge from 4:00 to 8:00 p.m. weekdays, a fee intended to draw out more cabs during rush
hour.").
23I See Transport for London, Where and When, http://www.tfl.gov.uk/t11/roadusers/
congestioncharge/whereandwhen (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
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poses a flat fee for access to the central city during the hours of 7:00
a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on weekdays; no fee is required during other hours. 252
The second axis along which congestion pricing schemes can be
measured is the availability, and pricing, of substitutes. It is possible
for all viable substitutes for a congestion-priced road to be themselves
subject to congestion pricing (or to some other form of tolls); in the
alternative, it is possible for substitute roads (or public transit) to be
offered at no cost. This distinction can be used to divide congestion
pricing regimes into two categories: regimes that charge for access to
particular roads or lanes on a road, and regimes that charge for access
to a particular region regardless of the route taken, the latter being
known commonly as "cordon-pricing" regimes. 255
The recently enacted congestion pricing regime in London is an
example of cordon-pricing. 254 Those who choose not to pay for access
to the central city during the day have the option of using public tran-
sit—which is less expensive, but not free. 255 Though some London
workers have complained that their circumstances leave them with no
viable substitute to paying the central city access fee, 256 overall the Lon-
2" Id. Exemptions and discounts are available for, among others, residents of the cen-
tral city; disabled persons, vehicles that seat nine or more, and alternative fuel vehicles. See
Transport for London, Discounts and Exemptions, http://www.tflgov.tik/roadusers/
congestioncharging/6713.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2008). On the London congestion
charge plan, see generally RICHARDS, supra note 249.
255 See U.S. Dir,P'T OF TRANSP., CONGESTION PRICING: A PRIMER 1 (2006) [hereinafter
CONGESTION PRICING], available at http://wwwops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/congestion
pricing/congestionpricing.pclf. (defining cordon pricing as "either variable or fixed charges
to drive within or into a congested area within a city.").
254 See Transport for London, Charging Zone, http://www.tfLgov.uk/roadusers/
congestioncharging/6709.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2008) ("Certain vehicles which drive
within a clearly defined zone of central London during its hours of operation have to pay a
daily Congestion Charge.").
255 Public transit is also not a perfect substitute for roadway access. See Oren, supra note
97, at 213-31 (discussing the importance to Americans of driving vehicles, and surveying
how that ideal has frustrated attempts to change driving patterns through behavioral
modification).
I" For example, workers at a London meat market had argued that they ought not to
have to pay the congestion toll "because they come to the market in the middle of the
night and go home by midmorning, When their day starts [at] around 3 a.m., they say,
little public transportation is available." London Institutes Its New Anti-Gridlock Toll; Few Prob-
lems Are Reported on First Day, Sr. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 18, 2003, at A8. The workers
contemplated filing a lawsuit challenging the imposition of the toll, but ultimately agreed
not to in return for "assurances given by Ken Livingstone, the Mayor of London, that he
would consider introducing a cheaper rate for drivers on low incomes." Ben Webster, Work-
ers Abandon Charge Challenge, TIMFS (London), Feb. 22, 2003, at 14.
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don plan seems to be faring reasonably well and even earning some
public accolades.257
The alternative to a cordon-pricing regime is the category of re-
gimes for which vehicles must pay for access to a particular roadway or
lanes on a roadway; substitutes, in the form of alternate roadways or
other lanes, are available at no cost (and sometimes, as discussed below,
are even subsidized 258). For example, the San Diego 1-15 "FasTrak" pric-
ing scheme charges single-occupant vehicles for access to the road's
express lanes. 259 But access to the highway's local lanes remains free. 26°
Regimes that fall under this category may further be broken down
into subcategories. 261 A simple example is a regime that charges drivers
for access to a particular roadway. 262 Another simple example is a re-
gime that charges drivers for access to particular lanes on a roadway. 263
Often these lanes will be "express lanes" that bypass numerous exits,
allowing users of the charged lanes to avoid the additional traffic and
entrance and exit ramps that numerous exits generate. 2M Along similar
lines, access for lanes may be priced where the lanes are designed to
avoid areas along the primary roadway where the free lanes suffer bot-
tleneck conditions. 265
A hybridization of lane-access pricing occurs where lane access is
also permitted to particular vehicles on a basis other than cost. 266 An
example of this is "HOT lanes" systems.s7 According to the U.S. De-
partment of Transportation (the "DOT"),
"HOT" is the acronym for "High Occupancy/Toll." On HOT
lanes, low occupancy vehicles are charged a toll, while High-
Occupancy Vehicles (HOVs) are allowed to use the lanes free
237 See, e.g., Jill Lawless, Supporters, Foes Agree: London Traffic Fee Milts, NEW ORLEANS
TIM ES- P ICA's'UN E, May 18, 2003, at A23.
2s8 See infra notes 270-273 and accompanying text (discussing "FAIR lanes").
259 Pricing, supra note 253, at 2 (explaining that low occupancy vehicles
are charged a toll, while high occupancy vehicles, public transit vehicles. and emergency
vehicles are allowed use of the lanes free of charge, or at a reduced rate).
266 See id.
261 See id. at 1-4.
262 See id. at 3.
263 See id. at 2.
264 See CONGESTION PRICING. supra note 253, at 2.
265 See U.S. Dep't of Transp., Terminology, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/otps/
terminology.hun (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) ("Queue jumps are roadway facilities that can
he used by drivers paying a toll to bypass points on the transportation network where con-
gestion is typically severe (colloquially, a 'bottleneck').").
266 See CONGESTION PRICING, supra note 253, at 2.
267 See Id.
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or at reduced rates. HOT lanes create an 'additional category
of eligibility to use HOV lanes. People can either meet the
minimum vehicle passenger requirement—or they can choose
to pay a toll to gain access to the HOV lane. 268
The San Diego "FasTrak" system is an example of a HOT lanes regime.
Interest in such regimes is growing. 269
Yet another variant on lane-pricing access is a "FAIR lanes" re-
gime.270 According to the DOT,
The strategy, called "FAIR lanes," or "Fast and Intertwined
Regular" lanes, seeks to alleviate public concerns about con-
version of currently free lanes to value-priced lanes. FAIR lanes
involve separating congested freeway lanes into two sections—
fast lanes and regular lanes—using plastic pylons and striping.
The fast lanes would provide improved transit ... and would
be electronically tolled, with tolls set in real time to limit traffic
to the free-flowing maximum. ...
In the regular lanes, constricted flow would continue; how-
ever, drivers with electronic toll tags would be compensated
with credits that could be used as toll payments on days when
they choose to use the fast lanes, or as payment for transit and
paratransit services that would be subsidized using toll reve-
nues. The credits would compensate motorists for giving up
their right to free use of the lanes converted to fast lanes.271
FAIR lanes thus are a hybrid between pure congestion pricing and sub-
sidy regimes. 272 The incorporation of a subsidy element may provide an
opportunity to ameliorate what some perceive to be equity shortcom-
ings in standard congestion pricing regimes. 273
296 Id.
269 See id. at 6.
2" See U.S. Dep't of Transp., Public Roads, Along the Road (Nov./Dec. 2001), http://
www.tlhrc.gov/pubrds/novdec01 /alongnov. htm.
271 Id.
272 For a discussion of the use of subsidies to reduce traffic congestion, see supra note
200 and accompanying text.
273 See infra notes 368-376, 393 and accompanying text (discussing equity in the con-
text of congestion pricing); see also supra notes 256-257 and accompanying text.
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C. Current Federal Role in Fostering Congestion Pricing Regimes
Public money to construct roads comes from the federal govern-
ment and from state governments. 274 The "federal-aid highway pro-
gram" (the "FAHP") is the primary federal source of funds for highway
construction. 275 It is administered by the DOT's Federal Highway Ad-
ministration. 276 The FAHP is "basically a federally funded state pro-
gram"277 in which "[m] onies for the federal-aid highway system are pro-
vided primarily by the Federal Highway Trust Fund, fueled by taxes on
gasoline, motor vehicles, and automotive parts. "278 The FAHP provides
federal funding to roads within the "federal-aid systems. "279 The two
federal-aid systems are the "Interstate System" 288 and the "National
Highway System,"281 of which the Interstate System is a component. 282
In fact, the Interstate System constitutes a very small part of all
roads—only 4.9% of all federally subsidized roadway miles, and only
1.2% of all total roadway miles in the United States. 283 Still, though In-
274 See, e.g., David R. Fiore & John M. Stafford, Intermodal Transportation Planning for the
Environment: Social, Cultural, and Economic Considerations for an Interdisciplinary Solution for
Change, 23 111ANSP. L.J. 237, 251 n.36 (1995).
2" Edward V. A. Kussy, Wetland and Floodplain Protection and the Federal-Aid Highway Pro-
gram, 13 ENVTL, L. 161, 164 (1982) ("Although the FAHP represents a relatively small por-
tion of the total highway construction effort, it is still of enormous significance. It is one of
the largest and most costly federal construction grant programs.").
278
277 Id.
278 Houck, supra note 182, at 897 n.176; see also Fiore & Stafford, supra note 274, at 251
n.36 ("In FY 1991, the Federal Highway Trust Fund net receipts for motor fuel constituted
more than eighty-eight percent of all revenue sources. ... States similarly depend largely
on motor fuel receipts for state and federal highway projects that have matching shares
requirements." (citation omitted)).
279 See 23 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (defining the "Federal-aid systems");
23 C.F.R. § 470.103 (2007) (same); see also 23 U.S.C. § 101(a) (5) (2000 & Stipp. V 2005)
("The term 'Federal-aid highway' means a highway eligible for assistance under this chap-
ter other than a highway classified as a local road or rural minor collector."); 23 C.F.R.
§ 470.103 ("Federal aid highways means highways on the Federal-aid highway systems and
all other public roads not classified as local roads or rural minor collectors.").
280 For the definition of the "Interstate System," see 23 U.S.C. § 103(c); 23 C.F.R.
§ 470.107(a); see also 23 C.F.R. § 470.111 (procedures governing the Interstate System). For an
overview of the Interstate System, see U.S. Dep't of Transp., Dwight D. Eisenhower National
System of Interstate and Defense Highways, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/prograrnadmin/
interstate.cfm (Last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
281 For the definition of the "National Highway System," see 23 U.S.C. § 103(b); 23
C.F.R. § 470.107(b); see also 23 C.F.R. § 470.113 (procedures governing the National High-
way System).
282 23 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2) (A) (defining the National Highway System to include the In-
terstate'System) ; 23 C.F.R. § 470.107 (b) (1) (same).
283 As of October 2002, there were 3,981,670 miles of roads in the United States. See
U.S. Dept of Transp., PUBLIC ROAD LENG11-1 —2002: MILES BY OWNERSHIP AND FEDERAL-
20081	 Economic Efficiency, Public Choice & Road Traffic Management 	 717
terstate Highways may constitute a relatively small proportion of all
roads—and even of all roads in the National Highway System—they
represent a far greater portion of the nation's transportation road net-
work than their total mileage might suggest. 284 This is because of the
role that the Interstate Highway system is designed to fulfill: Interstate
Highways are to be "located so as ... to connect by routes, as direct as
practicable, the principal metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial cen-
ters."285 These well-maintained roads carry an inordinate amount of
traffic for the mileage they represent. 286
Federal law imposes various restrictions on roads that receive fed-
eral funding. 287 Among them is a restriction on the implementation
and maintenance of tolls. 288 The existing structure of federal law, under
title 23 of the United States Code, is quite hostile to the imposition of
Am HIGHWAYS NATIONAL SUNIMARY, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/
hs02/pclf/hm16.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2008). Of that, 3,079,758 miles were in rural areas,
and 901,912 were in urban areas (with 183,502 in small urban areas and 718,410 in urban-
ized areas). Id. Of the total 3,981,670 miles of roads, only 959,324 miles (i.e., just over
twenty-four percent of roadway miles) received FAHP funding. Id. Of those 959,324 subsi-
dized roadway miles, only 161,539—or 16.8%—are part of the National Highway System.
Id. The Interstate Highway System consists of 46,748 miles of road, which constitutes
28.9% of the National Highway System, only 4.9% of all federally subsidized roadway miles,
and only 1.2% of all total roadway miles in the United States. Id.
By comparison, based on 1979 statistics,
The total mileage of all roads and streets in the United States is 3,957,819. Of
these, 3,223,710 miles are in rural areas, while 693,786 miles are in municipal
areas. Of this total mileage, only 824,832 miles (or 21%) were funded
through the FAHP.... The interstate system.has 42,894 miles, which is 14%
of the primary system, 5% of the federal-aid system, and only 1% of all roads
in the United States.
Kussy, supra note 275, at 164 11.5 (citing U.S. Dcp'r OF TRANSP., 1-11GliwAv STATIsTies
1979 (1980)).
284 See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 103 (c) (1) (C) (i).
285 Id. The statute directs that Interstate Highways are also to be located so as to "serve
the national defense," id. § 103(c) (1) (C) (ii), and so as, "to the 'maximum extent practica-
ble, to connect at suitable border points with routes of continental importance in Canada
and Mexico," id. § 103(c) (1) (C) (iii).
286 See, e.g., Status of the Nation's Highway and Transit Systems: Capital and Maintenance
Needs Before the Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure: Subcomm. on Highways and Transit,
107th Cong. 64 (2002) (statement of Katherine Siggerud, Acting Director, Physical Infra-
structure Issues, Government Accounting Office) ("The [Interstate Highway System] car-
ries over 24 percent of all vehicle miles traveled in the nation, while making up just 2.5
percent of total lane miles.").
287 See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (barring tolls on roads constructed with federal
highway funds).
288 See id.
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tolls—of any kind—on Interstate Highways. 289 Section 301 announces a
general rule that bars toils from roads that are constructed with federal
highway funds.290 The section's caption suggests the seriousness with
which Congress—presumably in response to perceptions of, if not ac-
tual, public opinion—views the subject: "Freedom from tolls."291
Despite the breadth of its language and the audacity of its caption,
§ 301 subjects its toll preclusion rule to the provisions of § 129. 292 And -
§ 129 provides a fairly broad exception to § 301's general rule. 293
Though it preserves § 301's general proscription against tolls with re-
spect to highways constituting part of the Interstate System, it otherwise
permits the provision of federal funds for toll roads and allows for the
introduction of tolls on roads receiving federal funding. 294 The provi-
sion grandfathers in existing toll segments of the Interstate System, al-
lowing for funding for "reconstructing, resurfacing, restoring, and re-
habilitating" such segments. 295 As a result, "[a] pproximately 2,900 miles
299 See id.
290 See id. The provision states: "Except as provided in section 129 of this title with re-
spect to certain toll bridges and toll tunnels, all highways constructed under the provisions
of this title shall be free from tolls of all kinds." Id.
291 Id.
202 23 U.S.C. § 301 (subjecting the bar against tolls to "section 129 of this title with re-
spect to certain toll bridges and toll tunnels").
"3 Sec 23 U.S.C. § 129 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). The exception to the bar against tolls
developed over time:
The Federal-aid highway program, when created in 1916, allowed no use of
Federal-aid funds on toll facilities. This position remained unchanged until
1927 when Congress enacted legislation that permitted Federal-aid highway
funding to be used to construct toll bridges and approaches. Subsequent legis-
lation provided more flexibility 'on using Federal-aid highway funds for im-
provements to toll facilities with the last significant changes being made in 1991
with passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991.
U.S. Dep't of Tramp., Federal-Aid Highway Toll Facilities, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
programadmin/tollfac.cfm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Federal-Aid Highway
Toll Facilities].
294 Sec 23 U.S.C. § 129 (a) (1); id. § 129(a) (2)—{5) (setting forth restrictions on funding).
295 See id. § 129(a) (1)(B). The DOT explains:
Although the Interstate System is free of tolls for the most part, Congress de-
cided in 1956 to include sonie toll facilities in the System. Generally, these
were major toll roads built or planned before Federal funding for construc-
tion of the Interstate System increased significantly in 1956. Inclusion of these
toll roads in the Interstate System enhanced connectivity without having to
build competing free routes in the same transportation corridors. Addition-
ally, including these toll segments freed highway user lax revenues to develop
other non-toll segments of the System sooner,
Federal-Aid Highway Toll Facilities, supra note 293.
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of toll facilities are included in the 46,730-mile [Interstate] System." 296
Until 1991, however, federal law precluded the introduction of new
tolls are on the Interstate System.297
The first crack in the statutory bar against new Interstate System
tolls was introduced by the 1991 passage of the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act ("ISTEA"). 298 Section 1012(b) of ISTEA,
captioned "Congestion Pricing Pilot Program," directed the DOT to
"solicit the participation of State and local governments and public au-
thorities for one or more congestion pricing pilot projects" 299 and au-
thorized the DOT to approve up to five such projects. 900 ISTEA further
authorized the introduction of new toll segments on Interstate High-
ways in three of the pilot projects." 1
The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century ('TEA-21")
amended ISTEA's "congestion pricing pilot project" provisions." 2 First,
TEA-21 replaced the moniker "congestion pricing pilot project" with
"value pricing pilot programs." 3 On a substantive level, TEA-21 in-
296 Federal-Aid Highway Toll Facilities, supra note 293. For a catalog of toll and nontoll
roads, bridges, tunnels, and ferries in the United States, see generally Tom. FACILITIES IN
THE U.S., supra note 84. For a list of toll bridges and tunnels that are part of the Interstate
Highway System, see id. at 3. For a list of toll bridges and tunnels outside the Interstate
Highway System, see id. at 4-8. For a list of toll roads that are part of the Interstate High-
way System, see id. at 9-12. For a list of toll roads outside the Interstate Highway System,
see id. at 13-16.
297 See Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat.
1914 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
2913 Id,
2" Id. § 1012(b)(1).
mo Id. ("The Secretary [of Transportation] may enter into cooperative agreements
with as many as 5 State or local governments or public authorities to establish, main-
tain, and monitor congestion pricing projects.").
3°1 Id. § 1012(b) (4) ("Notwithstanding sections 129 and 301 of title 23, United States
Code, the Secretary [of Transportation] shall allow the use of tolls on the Interstate System
as part of a pilot program under this section, but not on more than 3 of such programs.");
see also id. § 1012(b) (2) ("Notwithstanding section 129 of title 23, United States Code, the
Federal share payable for such [pilot] programs shall be 80 percent").
592 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
303 Id. § 1216(a) (1) (B) (i), (ii) ("Section 1012(b) of [ISTEA] ... is amended ... in
paragraph (1) by striking 'congestion' each place it appears and inserting 'value% and by
striking 'projects' each place it appears and inserting 'programs'...."); see also id.,
§ 1216(a) (1) (A) (changing the subsection 1012(b)'s heading from "Congestion Pricing
Pilot Program" to "Value Pricing Pilot Program"); U.S. Dept of Transp., Office of Trans-
portation Policy Studies, Value Pricing Pilot Program, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/
otps/valuepricing.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Value Pricing Pilot Pro-
gram] (stating that the Value Pricing Pilot Program "replaced the Congestion Pricing Pilot
Program that was authorized by the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of
1991").
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creased the maximum number of value pricing pilot programs from
five to fifteen.3D 4 The law also extended the suspension of §§ 129 and
301's bar against new tolls on Interstate Highways to apply not just to
three pilot programs but to all of them." 6
Importantly, TEA-21 also expanded the possible purview of value
pricing pilot programs by allowing them to make use of high-
occupancy vehicle ("HOV") lanes. 306 Federal law provides that "[a]
State agency that has jurisdiction over the operation of a HOV facility
shall establish the occupancy requirements of vehicles operating on the
facility,"6" but also directs that, "reixcept as otherwise provided by this
section, no fewer than two occupants per vehicle may be required for
use of a HOV facility.""6 TEA-21 was the first law to eliminate the
minimum two-person HOV vehicle occupancy requirement with re-
spect to value pricing pilot programs. 3D9 This allowed for "HOT lane"
congestion pricing programs that, like the San Diego FasTrak program,
allow vehicles with fewer than the minimal number of occupants to
purchase access to the HOV lanes. 310
ISTEA further spurred state and local governments to consider the
implementation of congestion pricing programs (though not necessar-
ily on Interstate Highways) by directing the creation of state and local
304 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, § 1216(a) (2) ("Section 1012(b) (1)
of [ISTEA] is amended in the second sentence by striking '5' and inserting '15.'").
303 Id. § 1216(a) (4) ("Section 1012(b) (4) of (ISTEA] is amended by striking 'a pilot
program under this section, but not on more than 3 of such programs' and inserting any
value pricing pilot program under this subsection.'"). Beyond the value pricing pilot pro-
grams, TEA-21 created the Interstate System reconstruction rehabilitation pilot program, a
limited program that allows for the introduction of new tolls on Interstate Highways "for
the purpose of reconstructing and rehabilitating highway corridors that could not other-
wise be adequately maintained or functionally improved without the collection of tolls." Id.
§ 1216(b)(1).
306 23 U.S.C. § 166(a) (1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
907 Id. An earlier version authorized the "State transportation department [to] establish
the occupancy requirements of vehicles operating in high occupancy vehicle lanes." 23 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (2000) (repealed by Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act:
A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 1121(b) (1),119 Stat. 1144, 1195 (2005)).
908 23 U.S.C. § 166(a) (2). An earlier version directed that "no fewer than 2 occupants
per vehicle may be required." 23 U.S.C. § 102(a).
309 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, § I216(a) (5) (amending ISTEA
section 1012(b)(6) to read: "Notwithstanding section 146(c) of title 23, United States
Code, a State may permit vehicles with fewer than 2 occupants to operate in high occu-
pancy vehicle lanes if the vehicles are part of a value pricing pilot program under this sub-
section."): see Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105.206, § 9006(b), 112 Stat. 685, 848 (amending TEA-2I section 1216(a) (5) "by striking
'146(c) ' and inserting '102(a)'").
310 See supra notes 259. 268 and accompanying text.
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transportation planning units—known as "metropolitan planning or-
ganizations" ("MPOs") 311 —and by introducing the Congestion Mitiga-
tion and Air Quality Improvement Program (the "CMAQ Program"). 312
MPOs are to develop transportation plans for urbanized areas, with the
overall goal of "maximiz [ing] mobility of people and goods within and
through urbanized areas and minimiz[ing] transportation-related fuel
consumption and air pollution."313 Among the factors that MPOs were
to consider in generating transportation plans, tinder the statute as
originally enacted, were "kJ he need to relieve congestion and prevent
congestion from occurring where it does not yet occur."314 Further,
MPOs are to develop long-range transportation plans; 313 the original
wording of the statute called for MPOs to "recommend[ ] ... innova-
tive financing techniques to finance needed projects and programs,
including such techniques as .. tolls and congestion pricing." 316
TEA-21 revised the ISTEA both to eliminate the mandatory con-
sideration of congestion relief in developing transportation plans 317
and to delete the express reference to congestion pricing. 318 Following
amendment by TEA-21, the statute directs that long-range transporta-
tion plans "[a]ssess capital investment and other measures necessary to
... make the most efficient use of existing transportation facilities to
relieve vehicular congestion and maximize the mobility of people and
goods."319 Further, the current statute provides, for transportation
management areas—that is, "each urbanized area with a population of
over 200,000 individuals"320—that the "transportation planning process
. include a congestion management system that provides for effective
311 See Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 102-240, § 1024(a),
105 Stat. 1914, 1955 (1991) (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 134 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
312 See id. § 1008(a) (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 149 (2000 & Supp. V 2005));
The Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement {CMAQ) Program of the Inter-
modal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act—Guidance Update, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,890
(1996) [hereinafter CMAQ Program Guidance Update].
313 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, § 1024(a) r[S]erv[ing] the mo-
bility needs of people and freight and foster[ing] economic growth and development
within and between States and urbanized areas, while minimizing transportation-related
fuel consumption and air pollution.").
3 ' 4 Id.
" 5 Id.
316
317 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 1203(1), 112
Stat. 107, 174 (1998) (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 134(f) {2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
318 rd.§ 1203(g) (3).
319 In termodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, § 1024(a).
32° 23 U.S.C. § 134(k) (1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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management of new and existing transportation facilities eligible for
fun din g."321
The CMAQ Program is designed to encourage transportation
planning with an eye not only to improving efficient transportation, but
also to improving air quality. 322 Emissions from motor vehicles contrib-
ute substantially to air pollution and, in particular, can be a primary
reason for a region's inability to comply with national ambient air qual-
ity standards ("NAAQS") generated under the Federal Clean Air Act. 323
The CMAQ Program provides federal funding for state "transportation
projects or programs that will contribute to attainment of [the
NAAQS), primarily for ozone and carbon monoxide."324 Regulatory
guidance indicates that "travel demand management" is one of the
items for which CMAQ Program funds may be made available, and it
makes clear that travel demand management includes "road pricing
measures. "325
Though value pricing is in its domestic infancy', in 2004, the Senate
contemplated eliminating new value pricing programs. 326 A bill would
have repealed the authorization for new value pricing programs, 327 al-
though it would have allowed existing programs to continue. 328 Ulti-
mately, in August 2005, Congress enacted a new transportation statute,
dubbed the "Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Eq-
uity Act: A Legacy for Users" ("SAFETEA-LU") . 329 SAFETEA-LU retains
the value pricing program. 330 It also establishes an express lanes dem-
321 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, § 1029 (a).
322 See generally CMAQ Program Guidance Update, supra note 312.
323 Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency must generate
NAAQS for so-called constituent pollutants. See 92 U.S.C. § 7910 (2000). The states must
then develop "state implementation plans' that are designed to regulate in-state sources in
such a way as to achieve compliance with the NAAQS. See id.
324 Wahrman, supra note 8, at 188 (footnote omitted).
325
 CMAQ Program Guidance Update, supra note 312, at 50,895; sec also id. at 50,896
("The FHWA and FTA continue to recommend that States and MPOs put together their
transportation/air quality programs using complementary measures that simultaneously
provide alternatives to [single-occupancy vehicle] travel while reducing demand through
pricing, parking management, regulatory or other means.").
326
 See S. 1072, 108th Cong. (2004).
127 Id. § 1609(c)(1) ("Section 1012 of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Effi-
ciency Act ... is amended by striking subsection (b).").
325 Id. § 1609(c) (2) ("Notwithstanding the amendment made by paragraph ( 1), the
Secretary shall monitor and allow any value pricing program established under a coopera-
tive agreement in effect on the day before the date of enactment of this Act to continue.").
32g Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Us-
ers, Pub. L. No. 109-59. 119 Stat. 1144 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
23 U.S.C.).
3" See id. § 1609(a).
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onstration program."' The program calls for the establishment of fif-
teen toll-collection facilities on the Interstate System with the purpose
of either managing congestion, reducing emissions levels, or financing
roadway expansion. 332 The tolls to be charged in such programs "may
var[y] in price according to time of day or level of traffic, as appro-
priate to manage congestion or improve air quality." 333 Further, the
statute requires, "for each high occupancy vehicle facility that charges
tolls under this subsection, that the tolls vary in price according to time
of day or level of traffic, as appropriate to manage congestion or im-
prove air quality."334
In sum, though federal funding may be provided for toll roads, the
availability of federal funding for Interstate Highways—the most impor-
tant component of the nation's highway network—remains quite cir-
cumscribed. The value pricing pilot programs present the possibility of
broader use of congestion pricing in the future, although there is some
political sentiment to preclude expansion of such programs. 335
D. Existing Congestion Pricing Regimes
This Section presents a brief survey of some current U.S. conges-
tion pricing 'programs. 336 At the outset, however, it bears noting that
several congestion pricing programs abroad—including programs in
Singapore, Trondheim, Toronto, and London—have had considerable
success.337 Moreover, as discussed above, the success of one of these
programs—the one in Singapore—is at least somewhat responsible for
the increased attention paid to congestion pricing regimes domesti-
cally,338 and the success of another program—the fledgling program in
331 See id. § 1604(b).
332 See id. § 1604(b) (2).
333 Id. § 1604(b) (3) (B) (1).
334 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Us-
ers, § 1604(b) (3) (B) (ii). The statute further provides that a State may permit motor vehi-
cles with fewer than two occupants to operate in high occupancy vehicle lanes as part of a
variable toll pricing program established under this subsection." Id. § 1604(b) (3) (B) (iii).
333 See id. § 1604.
336 See Value Pricing Pilot Program, supra note 305. Note that the projects sununarized
here are a subset of all value pricing programs; some projects (such as projects that involve
parking pricing) do not fall under the rubric of congestion pricing (at least as the termi-
nology is used here).
337 See, e.g., Strahilevtiz, supra note 9, at 1249 (noting that the Singapore program is
"generally viewed as a successful and efficient way to control traffic congestion").
338 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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London339—may bolster prospects for even greater use of congestion
pricing domestically.
Toll roads in New Jersey (the New Jersey Turnpike) and California
(the San Joaquin Hills Toll Road) currently feature congestion pric-
ing.340 In addition, tolls to cross the Hudson River from New York to
New Jersey (via the George Washington Bridge or the Lincoln or Hol-
land Tunnels) and tolls to cross two bridges in Lee County, Florida are
subject to congestion pricing."' Plans are being developed to introduce
congestion pricing on additional toll roads in Florida, Pennsylvania,
Illinois, and Ohio. 342
Domestically, interest in and use of lane-pricing access programs is
increasing.343 Express lanes on an Orange County; California highway
are already subject to congestion pricing, and programs are under devel-
opment to introduce congestion pricing on lanes in other highways in
California, Florida, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. 344
Interest in development of HOT lanes is especially intense. Besides
the San Diego FasTrak program, HOT lanes programs are in effect on
two highways in Houston, and in Colorado and Minnesota. 343 Proposals
to introduce HOT lanes are under development for highways in Cali-
fornia, Florida, Georgia, and Washington,346 and are also being consid-
ered for highways in Maryland and Virginia. 347
No FAIR lanes regimes are currently in use, although plans for
FAIR lanes programs are under development for a highway in Califor-
nia.34.3 Also, although no cordon-pricing regime is in use domestically, a
proposal to subject all East River crossings into and out of New York
City's Manhattan Island (combined with the existing congestion pricing
regime for Hudson River crossings) would, if implemented, create a de
facto cordon-pricing regime. 349 In 2007, Mayor Michael Bloomberg
s" See supra notes 254-257 and accompanying text.





545 See List of Projects by Type, supra note 44.
546 See id.
m 7 See Editorial, HOT Prospects, WAsti. Pos.r, Dec. 29, 2003, at A16.
549 See Value Pricing Pilot Program, supra note 303.
949 See id.
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proposed the introduction of cordon-pricing in southern Manhattan,
although the proposal was stymied by political opposition. 35°
E. Economics and Public Choice of Congestion Pricing
The economic underpinnings of congestion pricing are depicted
above, in Figure 1. Essentially, congestion gives rise to an externality be-
cause drivers internalize only their own costs, rather than society's actual
costs.35 ' Congestion pricing regimes endeavor to remedy this situation
by requiring drivers to internalize the costs that otherwise would be ex-
ternalized.352
Congestion pricing results in better allocation of the scarce re-
source of roadway access. 353 It also reduces uneconomic overuse of
roads.354 In addition, such programs increase government coffers
through congestion pricing revenue.355 Further, congestion pricing
"saves society significant amounts of resources in obviating the estab-
lishment and maintenance of an oversized infrastructure network ...
[with the] consequence ... [that] much sought after tax dollars, land
and capital would be released for more socially beneficial tasks." 55
The economic benefits, and likely success, of congestion pricing
regimes seem clear. 357 Public choice and political economy considera-
tions, however, are not as favorable to congestion pricing regimes as
they are to the provision of new roadway capacity. 358 First, consider that
congestion regimes, unlike roadway capacity responses, do not, at least
currently, receive substantial support from powerful, organized interest
groups.353 In particular, the simple imposition of a congestion charging
regime offers politicians no support from the construction industry or
350 See infra notes 413-421 and accompanying text; see also Marisa Lagos, City Searches for
Traffic Innovations, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 11, 2005, at 5 (discussing the possibility of a cordon
congestion pricing program in San Francisco).
3" See Wahrntan, supra note 8, at 196.
"2 See supra notes 134, 225, and accompanying text. Note that some commentators do
not believe that all externalized costs should optimally be internalized. See supra note 234.
3" See Hau, supra note 229, at 224; Komanoff, supra note 138, at 131; Strahilevitz, supra
note 9, at 1246.
364 See Komanoff, supra note 138, at 131; Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1246.
5" See Komanoff, supra note 138, at 131; Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1246.
"6 Han, supra note 229, at 224.
757 See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1246 ("LIN current estimates are correct, a national
shift to congestion pricing would generate societal benefits of $5 to $11 billion annually
").
"6 See Buzbee, supra note 7, at 80.
3" But see infra note 424 and accompanying text (noting that some environmental or-
ganizations have announced support of congestion pricing).
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its workers. 360 Although there are industries that benefit from imple-
mentation of congestion pricing systems—for example, companies that
manufacture the transponders on which many of the systems rely—the
transportation and real estate construction industries seem to offer the
promise of more sizeable, better organized support, perhaps because of
the years those industries have had to hone their lobbying and political
relations expertise. 30
Second, consider public reaction to proposals to implement conges-
tion pricing. 362 Recall that public choice theory does not render public
opinion irrelevant.363 Public opinion may matter, both because the pub-
lic may bypass interest groups and make its strong opinion known to
government actors, or because interest groups may realize that they can
tap into latent public opinion to strengthen their case to legislators.364
In the case of congestion pricing, there is apparently plenty of la-
tent public opinion to tap into. 365 Public reaction to congestion pricing
tends to be strong and negative. 366 In particular, the public is doubtful
about congestion pricing for several reasons, including concerns of eq-
uity, general opposition to new government fees for items that previ-
ously were offered at no charge, concerns over privacy, and concerns
over the appropriateness of using market-based regimes to achieve en-
vironmental goals. 367
Equity concerns underlie many objections to the implementation
of congestion pricing programs. 368 First, to the extent that revenue from
a program is seen only to fill government coffers, drivers, and indeed
36° See Buzbee, supra note 7, at 80.
$61 For a discussion on the possibility that this might change in the future, see infra
notes 395-433 and accompanying text.
362 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
"3 Sce supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
364 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
365
 &clones, sttpm note 232, at 265-69.
366 See id.
367 Peter Jones highlights several concerns that the public-at-large tend to express over
congestion pricing schemes: (1) drivers have difficulty accepting a "charge for conges-
tion"; (2) the belief that urban road pricing is simply unnecessary; (3) the belief that con-
gestion pricing will not effectively reduce vehicular travel; (4) skepticism about the effec-
tiveness and accuracy of technology underlying congestion pricing; (5) concerns about
privacy; (6) concerns that a congestion pricing system based upon a particular "urban
boundary" may have substantial effects on areas near that boundary; (7) public perception
of congestion pricing as just another tax; and (8) the perception that congestion pricing is,
in one way or other, unfair. Jones, Stlpro note 232, at 265-69.
366 See, e.g., Peter M. Jones, Road Pricing: The Public Viewpoint, in ROAD Piticmc, supm
note 25, at 159.
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the public at large, may consider the program inequitable. 369 Indeed,
absent revenue recycling (i.e., government. use of the money to improve
the transport network), "most travelers will experience net losses as a
result of the introduction of road user charging, as for most people who
continue to drive [the] resulting time savings will be less than the road
user charge and so their consumer surplus will be reduced." 37°
An additional equity-related point is the perceived distributional
impact of a congestion-pricing regime.3" The burden of a congestion
pricing regime might be seen to fall heavily on poorer people. 372 In
other words, the regime might be characterized as a regressive tax. 373
Indeed, an efficient allocation of a resource may not always be distribu-
tionally fair, and the fact that efficiency should not always be rendered
subservient to distributional goals in the transport setting is clear. 374
Phil Goodwin observes that "there are some transport policies that no-
body suggests should be determined by `willingness-to-pay." 373 As an ex-
ample, Goodwin points to the allocation of road space between vehicles
and pedestrians, which, he contends, is not seriously the subject of
proposed pricing regimes. 376
389 See id.
37° Id. (citation omitted),
371 See Jones, supra note 232, at 268.
372 See id.
373 See id. (noting the public perception of congestion pricing regime as "W ust
[a] nother [norm of [t]axation"). Lior Strahilevitz compares the San Diego 1-15 conges-
tion pricing LIOV lane program to a tradable pollution permit regime. See Strahilevitz,
supra note 9, at 1288. But the structure of the program suggests that it is more similar to a
tax regime, insofar as no 'permit* allowing access to the highway express lanes is actually
tradable. A modified system, designed by Peter Jones to address equity concerns, bears
greater similarity to a tradable pollution permit regime:
[C]ar owning residents living within the charged area and other selected popu-
lation groups might be given a number of free Travel Units per month (either
using smartcard debiting system, or through an account held by each person).
Additional units could be purchased at the standard rate or at a discounted rate
(though in principle there could be differences here according to category of
user). By taking the idea further and making these free Travel Units available to
residents (with and without a car) and openly tradeable, then there would be a
further redistribution mechanism from the rich to the poor.
Jones, supra note 232, at 281.
074 See Goodwin, supra note 234, at 146; Jones, supra note 232, at 281.
375 Goodwin, supra note 234, at 196.
373 Id. Goodwin elucidates:
An example is the division of road space between vehicles and pedestrians. It
would be possible to say that the relative width of sidewalk and carriageway
should be determined by the amounts that pedestrians and vehicles are will-
ing to contribute, or even more specifically that pedestrian-actuated traffic
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Second, to the extent that congestion charges are imposed on
roads that previously were free, they may be perceived as a new tax. 577
Tax increases are never popular, and "[t]here will inevitably be resis-
tance to paying for something (i.e., road use) which was previously re-
garded as free at the point of use."578 This opposition will be exacer-
bated to the extent that the revenues from congestion charging
regimes are seen simply to fill government coffers, as explained just
above."9
Third, there are concerns about how implementation of conges-
tion pricing would intrude upon privacy."° Many congestion regimes
would rely upon technology that could allow government to track peo-
ple's whereabouts."'
Fourth, many people are uneasy, whether rationally or not, about
the use of market-based approaches to regulate the environment. 882
And this uneasiness is not absent in the traffic congestion setting.383 In
the context of a broad 1978 study of people's reactions to the use of
charges as an environmental regulatory tool, Steven Kelman asked the
following question in interviews with environmentalists:
Let's say that a parking surcharge developed as part of a
transportation control program reflected the costs a driver
signals should require the insertion of a coin. The logic in one sense is similar
to that of road pricing, but it does not command serious consideration. Nor
does there exist (as far as I know) an underground of hard-line road pricers
biding their time until the moment is right to implement pedestrian charging
with push-chair supplements and a penalty for elderly slow walkers.
Id. Goodwin's point clearly has merit, although one might argue that he overstates the case
somewhat, in that allocation of public spaces are in fact sometimes divided among differ-
ent users when supply of the resource becomes insufficient to meet overall demand. For
example, public spaces in parks are often divided between cyclists and rollerbladers on the
one hand and pedestrians and joggers on the other.
377 SeeJones, supra note 368, at 159; Strahilevtiz, supra note 9, at 1248.
378 Jones, supra note 368, at 159; set Strahilevia, supra note 9, at 1248 ("Loss-aversion
theory tells us that these types of changes are likely to spark strong opposition. Over the
years, commuters will increasingly see themselves as entitled to use the roadways that their
tax dollars helped build and maintain." (footnotes omitted)). This may be true to a lesser
extent for roads which had been flat-rate toll roads but on which a congestion pricing re-
gime now is superimposed (the George Washington Bridge, for example). See supra note
341 and accompanying text.
379 See Jones, supra note 368, at 159; Strahilevtiz, supra note 9, at 1248.
380 See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1248-49.
MI See id.
382 See STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
46-53 (1981).
383 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 232, at 268-79.
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imposes. on society by driving a car, including the damages
from auto pollution. If the surcharge reflected all such costs,
would you then feel it was OK for a person to drive his car in
the city center as long as he paid the surcharge, or would you
still criticize him for not taking available public transporta-
tion?384
Of the environmentalists questioned, "[s] ixty-seven percent ... said
they would still criticize the car driver." 385
It is possible to address some of these obstacles to the implementa-
tion of congestion pricing regimes through education. 9 ° For example,
public concerns about the need for, efficacy, and general propriety of
congestion pricing regimes might be addressed through education of
the public as to the proper working of the regimes.387
Other obstacles might be addressed through structural design
choices. For example, concerns over privacy could be ameliorated by
officially restricting the possible use of information gathered by virtue of
congestion pricing regimes. And the problem of substantial impact on
boundary regions could be addressed by designing regimes that do not
rely upon boundaries as "on/off switches" for the application of conges-
tion pricing.
The "no new tax" objection also can be addressed structurally, by
hypothecating the revenue from the regime (i.e., by promising that
the congestion fees gathered will be used in large measure either to
improve the highway or transit system or to offset some of the distri-
butional injustices to which the regime might be seen to give rise).
Indeed, public support • for congestion pricing schemes jumps sub-
stantially when the schemes are said to contemplate revenue recy-
Steven Kelman, Economic Incentives and Environmental Policy: Politics, Ideology, and Phi-
losophy, in INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 291, 314 (Thomas C. Schelling
ed., 1983).
385 Id.
388 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 232, at 269-70.
387 See id. Peter Jones argues:
Based on the concerns expressed by the public, it is evident that four general
arguments have to be won before road pricing can be introduced into urban
areas with majority public support. Namely that:
1. there is a need to take some action to restrain traffic levels;
2. the alternatives to road pricing are ineffective or insufficient;
3. road pricing is a practical and effective measure; and
4. equity concerns can be addressed.
Id.
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cling. 388 Along the lines of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Twersky's
"prospect theory"389 and the literature on framing and how mental
accounting may affect people's perceptions of various choices,39° it
may be that people will more readily accept the loss" of a "new tax"
when they perceive in connection with it a gain in some other area.
Another useful structural step is to make the pricing scheme trans-
parent and understandable; this will help people both to understand
and accept the program, and to make wise use of the pricing informa-
tion that the program provides in practice. 3"
Revenue recycling is also an important element of insulating con-
gestion pricing regimes from the charge that they are inequitable. 392
Revenue from congestion charges can be used, for example, to main-
tain existing roads, to improve the mass transportation system for driv-
ers who are priced out of roadway use, or even to subsidize poorer us-
ers' use of restricted roadways. 393 Also pertinent to the equity inquiry is
whether the advent of congestion pricing leaves reasonable substitutes
available to the public at no charge (or at least at a lesser charge).
In the end, however, the mere fact that some of the public's objec-
tions to congestion charges might be combated via education (or oth-
erwise) is irrelevant to the public choice inquiry—irrelevant, that is,
unless some interest group or political entrepreneur decides to try to
undertake the education necessary to shift public opinion and then
presumably to make use of the change in public opinion. Thus, even
with all these education and design options, public choice theory pre-
dicts that the path to implementation of congestion pricing regimes on
a broad scale appears to remain an uphill one. Most particularly, indus-
368 See Jones, supra note 368, at 168 ("Hypothecating revenues does seem to increase
public support [for congestion pricing systems] considerably—if; as a consequence, im-
provements in transport systems can be achieved. People then feel that they are getting
something for their money, either through improvements to the road network or in the
alternative methods of travel"); see id. at 168-70 (presenting survey results validating this
proposition).
599 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17,29-44 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tver-
sky eds., 2000).
590 See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND
FRAMES, supra note 389, at 241,243-54.
3sn Sec 116rje Johansson & Lars-GOran Mattsson, From Theory and Policy Analysis to the Im-
plementation of Road Pricing: The Stockholm Region in the 1990s, in ROAD PRICING, supra note
25, at 181,185.
392 Set, e.g., Richardson & Bae, supra note 231, at 248-49.
893 See id. ("Using windshield transponders ... , [congestion] prices could vary with in-
come upon submission of W2s (that is, official annual payroll summaries) and income tax
returns."); supra notes 270-273 and accompanying text (discussing FAIR lanes).
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try, worker, labor, and (therefore) political support remains substan-
tially in favor of the new roadway construction option. 194
V. ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC CHOICE EVALUATION OF NEW ROADWAY
CAPACITY AND CONGESTION CHARGES
This Part addresses the question of whether economic efficiency
or public choice has greater predictive accuracy in the context of traffic
congestion. 396 As detailed above, generation of new roadway capacity is
likely to be economically inefficient (at least over the long term) but
nonetheless likely at present to receive critical support from a public
choice perspective; congestion charges are more likely to be economi-
cally efficient, but less likely at present to be viable from a public choice
perspective.396 Because the provision of new roadway capacity continues
to dominate congestion pricing, there is little doubt that the public
choice theory has greater weight at present. 397 This Part then considers
399 See, e.g., FARBER & FRICREY, supra note 69, at 17-37 (discussing levels of influence in
the political process exercised by interest groups).
396 See infra notes 396-433 and accompanying text.
396 See supra notes 148-394 and accompanying text.
397 There are other governmental responses to the problem of traffic congestion, none
of which has either been used as extensively as the provision of new roadway capacity, or
has the promise of congestion pricing: (i) other market-based mechanisms, (ii) indirect
market-based mechanisms, (iii) land use planning, (iv) behavioral modification, and (v)
command-and-control approaches.
On the possibility and drawbacks of market-based instruments other than congestion
pricing, see supra note 200. Indirect market-based mechanisms include annual vehicle
license fees, gasoline taxes, and setting economic parking charges and parking taxes. Hau,
supra note 229, at 224. Although these instruments may offer benefits and should reduce
the total extent to which people drive, they do not directly address the problem of conges-
tion. See id.; Jerry L. Mashaw, The Legal Structure of Frustration: Alternative Strategies for Public
Choice Concerning Federally Aided Highway Construction, 122 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1,74 n.247 (1973).
Although land use planning could be a formidable tool to address congestion, it has
not been used that way. First, although Congress has sought to impose, indirectly, land use
controls on lands near federally designated highways through controls on available funds,
see, e.g„ 23 U.S.C. §§ 131(b), 136(b) (2000), most land use regulation occurs at the state,
and especially the local, level. Land use planning tends to be dominated in the political
arena by powerful interest groups, especially those who favor development. See Buzbee,
supra note 7, at 77-91 {presenting an overview of the political economy of "urban sprawl");
supra notes 182-198 and accompanying text (discussing the public choice pressure in favor
of development, and, therefore, generally in opposition to land use restrictions). Rarely,
moreover, are land use restrictions used to 'undo" development as a way to alleviate traffic
congestion. Cf. Michael Janofsky, In Towns That Slowed Growth, Backlash Stirs, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9,2003 (Magazine), at 20 (in Colorado, where the economy has sagged for two years,
several small towns eager to spur development and increase the local tax base are turning
away from growth restrictions.").
Behavioral modification involves attempts by the government to alter people's behav-
ior so as to reduce traffic congestion. Often grouped under the title "transportation de-
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whether the slight movement toward greater acceptance of congestion
pricing might signal a weakening in the public choice explanation and
mind management" (rDM"), see, e.g., Robert H. Frei	 & S. Mark White, Transportation
Congestion and Growth Management: Comprehensive Approaches to Resolving America's Quality of
Lift Crisis, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 915, 962-63 (1991) (discussing TDM); Stanley D. Abrams,
Implementing the Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance to Manage Transportation Congestion, SE1 I
A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL. EDUC. 595, 599-600 (1999) (same), such approaches
vary. First, government might request or create incentives to induce businesses to stagger
working hours. See 42 § 751 la(d) (1) (B) (2000) (giving states leeway under Clean
Air Act to include in attainment plans for severe ozone nonattainment areas requirements
that may induce employers to stagger working hours); Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism
Meets Congressional Aficromartagement: A Potential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16
HARV. EN' EL. L. REv. 175, 188-92 (1992) (critiquing the prior, more exacting version of
§ 7511a(d) (1)(B) for its erroneous emphasis on vehicle occupancy as opposed to average
ridership); cf. Emmerink, supra note 9, at 257-69 (presenting an empirical analysis of
worker schedule flexibility). Second, government might attempt to induce individuals to
choose public transportation over driving. For example, New York City's TransitChek Pro-
gram gives employees funds to pay for mass transit tax-free, the employers benefiting as
well from reduced payroll taxes. See TransitCen ter, Inc., Take Advantage of Tax Savings for
Commuters, http://www.transitcentencorn/employees  (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). (Note,
however, that the absence of congestion pricing regimes on highways may necessitate
greater subsidization of mass transit. See supra note 140.) Third, the government might
introduce HOV lanes. See supra note 268. Fourth, the government might provide informa-
tion about traffic congestion, allowing individual users to take that information into ac-
count in plotting their travel routes, with the hope of overall reductions in congestion. See
Emmerink, supra note 9, at 9-34. Behavioral modification approaches run into the en-
trenched American cultural ideal of driving a vehicle. See Oren, supra note 97, at 213-31
(discussing the importance to Americans of driving vehicles, and surveying how that ideal
has frustrated attempts to change driving patterns through behavioral modification); cf.
David W. Dunlap, Planners Seek More Streets Through Trade Center Site, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2004, at B3 ("One of the underlying principles of the plan to open more streets to traffic
at the former World Trade Center site] is that streets work better when they are filled with
cars and trucks. In contrast, pedestrian-only zones, which were once a favored device of
planners, can sometimes seem lifeless.").
Finally, command-and-control requirements mandate changes in people's driving be-
havior. These include the establishment of parking controls, the promotion of employer-
based mandatory trip reduction programs, and the implementation of an "odds and
evens" license plate vehicle authorization system. Hau, supra note 229, at 223. Though
command-and-control approaches remain the dominant form of domestic environmental
regulation, see, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation, 29
CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 24-25 (2001), they have been intensely criticized, especially for depriv-
ing societal actors of flexibility in complying with governmental goals, see Nash, supra note
200, at 486; Stewart, supra, at 24-25. The same criticisms apply in the context of traffic
congestion. See Hau, supra note 229, at 223-24 (comparing command-and-control ap-
proaches to "market-based measures" that "permit[] motorists the maximum flexibility of
choosing when, where and by what mode they desire to travel"). Beyond that, such pro-
grams face the difficult task of overcoming the widespread and robust attitude that driving
is a right. Cf Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1295-96 (2001) (draw-
ing on empirical evidence to conclude that the degree to which recycling behavior is con-
venient may encourage the behavior more than a social norm in favor of the behavior).
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a strengthening of the efficiency theory. 398 The movement, however,
can also be explained on public choice grounds.399 Moreover, the par-
ticular contexts in which much of the movement toward congestion
pricing is occurring suggest that it is a shift in the relevant interest
groups and public opinion, and not a shift in explanatory theory, that
underlies the movement toward greater acceptance of congestion pric-
ing.400
Because, at present, the efficiency theory predicts an increased
reliance on property rights through congestion pricing regimes,
whereas the public choice theory does not, the traffic congestion set-
ting provides a natural one in which to measure the predictive accuracy
of the theories. As noted above, the generation of new roadway capacity
remains the dominant government response to the problem of traffic
congestion. 40 The absence of the emergence of property rights—
through the implementation of congestion pricing regimes or other-
wise—strongly suggests, in turn, that the public choice theory for the
evolution of property rights dominates the efficiency theory.
There are signs, however, that the dominance of new roadway ca-
pacity may be fading, at least somewhat. 402 Even if it remains quite
popular, and even though opposition to congestion charges remains
strong, the fact is that recent years have seen an increase in the imple-
mentation of congestion pricing regimes, with even more regimes in
the planning stages. 4°3
The shift, albeit. perhaps comparatively small at this juncture, sug-.
gests that the traditional dominance of the public choice theory is
weakening. And, indeed, one might argue that, as traffic congestion has
continued to worsen—that is, as the size of the externality has grown—
so, too, has pressure grown on government actors to respond to the
problem in a more efficient way. This accords with the understanding
that the strength of the efficiency theory increases as the size of the ex-
ternality increases. 404 In addition, the efficiency theory predicts an in-
crease in property rights as the cost of delineating property rights
"8 See infra notes 399-433 and accompanying text.
399 See infra notes 419-433 and accompanying text.
4" See infra notes 404-433 and accompanying text.
481 See supra notes 148-199 and accompanying text.
482 See supra notes 336-350 and accompanying text.
4°3 See supra notes 336-350 and accompanying text.
1 °1 See supra note 67 and accompanying text; Rose, supra note 65, at 8-12 (noting that
the scope and complexity of environmental regulation will depend upon the extent to
which use of the underlying resource is congested).
734	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 49:673
drops:105 And, indeed, the move toward congestion prices corresponds
to drops in the cost of transponders technology and in the time neces-
sary to collect congestion-varied tolls. 4°6
With respect to the decrease in influence of the public choice the-
ory, one might argue that road construction was popular among large,
powerful interest groups, and they simply co-opted the congestion
problem as yet another justification for road construction. 407 Once the
congestion problem becomes "too large," however, the arguments in
favor of road construction face competition from economic pressure
for a "real" solution to traffic congestion.
That political opposition to congestion pricing remains robust
even in the face of strong efficiency pressures to implement such re-
gimes cannot be dotibted, 4° First, despite the success of pilot conges-
tion pricing programs, a bill was considered in the Senate that would
have curtailed pilot congestion pricing programs. 409
Second, if one had to identify a setting in the United States in
which congestion pricing would face the least opposition, it would
probably be New York City Politically, the city tends to be quite liberal
(at least compared to the rest of the United States), 41 ° which suggests
that one might expect less opposition to congestion pricing on the
ground that it imposes a new tax. 4 " Nowhere else in the United States,
moreover, is reliance upon public transit more possible or more strongly
405 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
4°5 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 232, at 264 (noting that 'with rapid development in tech-
nology (for example electronic vehicle identification, on- and off-vehicle toll collection
and enforcement), [practical constraints are] no longer [an issue] and there are almost
limitless possibilities for scheme design").
407 Sec Buzbee, supra note 7, at 80; Houck supra note 182, at 897-98; Strahilevitz, supra
note 9, at 1247.
408 See, e.g., S. 1072, 108th Cong. {2004); see also supra notes 327-328 and accompany-
ing text (referencing S. 1072).
4" See supra notes 327-328 and accompanying text.
410 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The
Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92 Comm.
L. REV. 775, 843 (1992) (noting that Staten Island produces many of the City's Republican
elected officials and is "the only borough that frequently votes Republican in municipal
elections"); Karen I. Chang, Note, The Party's Over: Establishing Nonpartisan Municipal Elec-
tions in New I'm* City, 111.1— & l'oCv 579, 589 11.55 (2003) ("More than sixty-five percent of
all registered voters are members of the Democratic Party. About eighty percent of voters
who are registered with a party are registered Democrats." (citation omitted)).
411 On the other hand, objections to congestion pricing grounded in concerns of fair-
ness might be more prevalent.
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engrained and accepted by the populace. 412 And the city suffers from
tremendous traffic woes.
Even in New York City, however, it has taken Mayor Michael
Bloomberg years to advance formally a congestion pricing proposal,
the fate of which even now remains uncertain. 413 The mayor initially
backed away from a proposal to charge vehicles that enter Manhattan
Island,414 and in 2007 lie finally proposed a cordon-pricing scheme for
traffic entering Manhattan south of 86th Street.'" The plan was re-
ceived enthusiastically by then-Governor Eliot Spitzer (at least initially)
and the U.S. Department of Transportation.'" Still, political opposition
from the "outer boroughs" —that is, those areas of the city where pub-
lic transit is less accessible and commutes on public transit are
longer417—is strong. 415 Further, state legislators, who had to approve
the plan, were tempered; 4" State Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver was
412 Patrick McGeehan, Mass Transit Grows as Commuters' Trip of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
2, 2006, at B1 (citing census data for the conclusion that "kilo other American city makes
half as much use of mass transit").
415
	
Thomas J. Lueck, Bloomberg Draws a 25-Year Blueprint fora Greener City, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2007, at Bl.
414 See Sewell Chan, Driving in Manhattan, You Pay, Under One Traffic Idea, N.Y. Tams,
Nov. 11, 2005, at Bl.
415 See Lueck, supra note 413.
416 See Danny Hakim & Ray Rivera, City Traffic Pricing Wins U.S. and Spitzer's Favor, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2007, at Al.
417 See McGeehan, supra note 412 ("New York's reliance on its transit system explains
why the boroughs other than Manhattan perennially top the list of American counties with
the longest commutes?).
418 E.g., William Neuman, Bigger Push for Charging Drivers Who Use the Busiest Streets, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2006, at Bl (identifying "a City Council member who represents some
neighborhoods in eastern Queens that are far from subway lines and where residents with
jobs in Manhattan are more likely to drive to work" as "lom ne of the most outspoken op-
ponents of congestion pricing"); Andy Newman, Outside • Manhattan, Many Oppose
Bloomberg's Traffic Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2007, at Bl. But see Ray Rivera, Queens Leader
Supports Bloomberg's Traffic Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2007, at 133 (noting the support of the
chair of the Queens Democratic party for congestion pricing). In the end, it seems that the
consolidation that enabled New York City to grow into the great metropolis it is today, see,
e.g., William D. Solecki & Robin Leichenko, Urbanization and the Metropolitan Environment:
Lessons from New York and Shanghai, 48 ENVIRONMENT 8, 15-17 (2006), may also impede the
introduction of congestion pricing.
419 See Nicholas Confessore, In Legislators' Scrutiny, Traffic Proposal Faces Hard Question-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2007, at B4; see also Nicholas Confessore, Pricing and Partisan Poli-
ties, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, at B5 ("New York City's outer boroughs and suburbs, hot-
beds of anti-pricing sentiment, are also home to many Senate Republicans who are
considered vulnerable to a Democratic challenge. But congestion pricing is a key priority
for Mr. Bloomberg, a Republican who has donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to
Republican senators."). It remains to be seen whether the mayor's decision to leave the
Republican party changes this calculus.
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critical of the proposal.'" The Mayor did appoint a commission to ex-
amine ways to reduce traffic congestion, including the possibility of
congestion pricing. 421 In the end, however, the congestion pricing pro-
posal expired without vote in the State Assembly on the deadline by
which it had to be approved in order to secure federal funding.422 Thus,
political power vanquished efficiency concerns, even in New York City.
The continued strength—and success—of political opposition to
congestion pricing suggests that congestion pricing will emerge not
only when congestion becomes bad enough that efficiency concerns
become too great to ignore, but also when political interests align be-
hind congestion pricing. Thus, to the extent that there is a shift toward
greater implementation of congestion pricing, it is simply the strength
of the relevant interest group players, and perhaps public opinion, that
is shifting. First, consider the possibility that support for congestion
pricing among reasonably powerful interest groups may be growing. As
transponder technology continues to flourish generally with respect to
toll collection, the transponder industry will continue to grow. And,
over time, there is likely to be greater interest on the part of the trans-
ponder industry to lobby for expanded use of transponders, including
through implementation of congestion pricing regimes. In addition,
although environmental groups remain divided on the question, 423
some have endorsed the use of congestion charges.424 It is possible that
42° See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Silver Challenges Health Benefits Promised in Manhattan Toll
Plan, N.Y TIMES, June 11, 2007, at 131.
421 See Nicholas Confessore, Spitzer Signs Bill to Put Congestion Pricing Plan on Track, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2007, at 85 (describing a state bill, "[t]he product of a marathon negotiation
that concluded July 19," that "create[s] a 17-member commission to consider different plans
for reducing traffic congestion in New Ibrk, including the pricing scheme favored by Mr.
Bloomberg"); William Neuman, Members Named far Pond Studying Traffic Pricing Plan, NA.
Tons, Aug. 22, 2007, at 132. Even this small step was sufficient to gain access to some federal
funding, although release of the funds is contingent upon a congestion pricing plan being
adopted by both the city council and state legislature by March 2008. See William Neuman,
New York to Get U.S. Traffic Aid, but with Catch, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, at RI.
422 See Nicholas Confessore, $8 Traffic Fee for Manhattan Fails in Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
8, 2008, at Al. Prospects for the proposal in the State Senate were not substantially better,
despite some support from the Republican leadership. See id.
423 See generally Merrill, supra note I, at 294 (noting the divide among environmental
organizations with respect to market-based environmental regulatory instruments and
suggesting reasons why some environmental organizations have shifted position to endorse
such instruments); cf. Keohane et al., supra note 73, at 353-56 (describing the community
of environmental organizations as predominantly hostile towards market-based instru-
ments, with a few "oudierfs]," and discussing reasons for this perhaps somewhat counter-
intuitive state of affairs).
424 See, e.g., NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, DAMAGE REPORT: ENVIRONMENT AND THE
105m CONGRESS ch. 4 (1998), available at http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/damage/
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these groups have offset somewhat the traditional interest group oppo-
sition to congestion charging in favor of new roadway capacity; indeed,
they may even have used—or may use in the future—education to try
to sway public opinion in favor of congestion charges. 425 This accords
well with President Bush's decision to appoint a transportation secre-
tary who favors expansion of congestion pricing.426
The location of the current frontier for congestion pricing lends
credence to the continued strength of the public choice theory. Other
than major metropolitan areas, like London and New York, where the
congestion externality has worsened and the possibility of introducing
new roads is practically impossible, congestion pricing has emerged (to
the extent it has emerged at all) in four basic settings: roadways (or
bridge or tunnel portions of roadways) that already were subject to toll-
ing, new roadways, new lanes on existing roadways, and HOT lanes. 427
The fact that congestion pricing has begun to take hold in these con-
texts conforms to public choice predictions on several grounds. 428 First,
the implementation of a congestion pricing regime on a new road or
on new lanes on an existing road is not likely to be seen as the imposi-
tion of a fee for something that previously was provided for free. 429
Thus, public opposition to congestion pricing under such conditions is
less intense.4"
Second, the fact that new roadway construction will be undertaken
means that the support of the transportation and real estate construc-
chap4.asp (citing the "Value Pricing Pilot Program, which will use market-based user fees
to help reduce congestion and air pollution and promote energy efficiency," as an exam-
ple of "positive environmental provisions" in TEA-21); Emil. Def. Fund, Congestion Pricing;
A Smart Solution for Reducing Traffic in Urban Centers and Busy Corridors, http://www.
environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?Content1D=4763 (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
425 See supra note 387 and accompanying text. David King, Michael Manville, and Donald
Shoup argue that the support of municipalities also can be harnessed by earmarking funds
from freeway congestion pricing for municipal use. See generally David King, Michael Manville
& Donald Shoup, The Political Calculus of Congestion Pricing, 14 TRANSP. POCY 111 (2007).
428 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
427 See supra notes 340-347 and accompanying text; cf. Johansson & Mattsson, supra
note 391, at 184-85 (arguing that a congestion pricing regime is most likely to be imple-
mented when presented as a "package" approach). Another possible "package" approach
would be to meld new roadway capacity, congestion charging, land use regulation, and
impact fees. See supra note 397 (describing impact fees as a hybrid between congestion
charges land use planning).
428 See Buzbee, supra note 7, at 80; Houck, supra note 182, at 897-98; Stmhilevitz, supra
note 9, at 1247.
429 See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 1247.
430 See id. ("Notably, ... congestion pricing for newly constructed toll roads garners sig-
nificantly higher public support.").
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tion industries, their workers, and organized labor should, in large
measure, persist:0 i Congestion pricing would be seen as part-and-
parcel with new roadway construction, rather than as a competitor to it.
Third, the fact that only new roadway capacity is to be subject to
congestion pricing means that preexisting capacity will remain open to
the public at no charge. This will blunt concerns, and objections, about
the equitable impact of congestion charging, for there will remain op-
tions not subject to congestion pricing that drivers can use." 2
Fourth, it may be that greater public interest in environmental
goals will spur support for congestion pricing. Congestion pricing may
be seen to be consistent with environmentalism. Support for conges-
tion pricing may increase substantially to the extent that environmental
organizations come to accept the use of market-based mechanisins. 433
CONCLUSION
This Article considers the responses that the two economic expla-
nations for the emergence of property rights—the efficiency and public
choice theories—predicted in response to scarcity in the resource of
roadway access. It demonstrates that, of the two primary governmental
responses to the problem of traffic congestion, one—the generation of
roadway capacity—is currently favored by the public choice theory for
the evolution of property rights, whereas the other—congestion
charges—is currently preferred by the efficiency theory. Although con-
gestion pricing is an attractive means by which to combat traffic conges-
tion from an economic perspective, implementation of such regimes is
hindered today by their general inability to garner political support. In
contrast, the provision of new roadway capacity, though likely ineffec-
tive—and perhaps even detrimental—from an efficiency perspective, is
likely at present to be a successful strategy in the political arena. This
Article also speculates that, though a slight movement toward greater
acceptance of congestion pricing might signal that the efficiency theory
has overtaken the public choice theory in terms of explanatory power,
the better explanation is that it is instead the public choice inputs, and
not the explanatory paradigm, that have shifted.
The relative explanatory power of the two theories in the context
of traffic congestion provides insight into the more general question of
431 See Buzbee, supra note 7, at BO; Houck, supra note 182, at 897-98.
432 This might not be true in the case of congestion charges being introduced on a
new road that is the first and only road in an area.
433 See supra note 424 and accompanying text.
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the relative strength of the efficiency and public choice accounts for
the development of property rights. The case of traffic congestion
strongly suggests that the public choice account has greater predictive
accuracy than does the efficiency account, at least at comparatively low
levels of resource use congestion. At higher levels of resource use con-
gestion, it appears that greater pressure to move toward a more effi-
cient regime arises. Even then, however, it seems that public choice at
least controls the specific nature of the shift toward greater efficiency, if
indeed it does not control the shift entirely.
